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INTRODUCTION
Congress makes mistakes. So do the courts, and so do administrative
agencies, when they interpret the statutes that Congress has enacted.
What constitutes a "mistake," of course, is often in the eye of the beholder.
* Associate Professor, Seton Hall University Schoolof Law. B.A., Indiana University, 1982;
J.D., University of Michigan Law School, 1986. 1 am grateful for the generous summer research
grant provided by the Seton Hall University School of Law that supported this project. Doug
Bellis, Angela Carmella, Abner Greene, Harold Krent, Lisa Nagle, Mike Paulsen, Marc Poirier, Sid
Shapiro, and Michael Solimine shared numerous valuable comments on earlier drafts of this Article.
Steve Skinner provided invaluable research assistance, and Mark Epley, Ralph Hellman, Mike
Piper, Jon Praed, and Susan Zimmerman helped me understand the inner workings of Corrections
Day. I also benefited greatly from the comments provided by the participants in a legal theory
workshop at Seton Hall on June 2, 1995, and from a discussionwith members of the Administrative
Law list serve. Consistent with the thesis of this Article, any remaining mistakes are my own.
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Sometimes Congress writes statutes with language that produces unintended
consequences, sometimes Congress fails to resolve an issue because of an
oversight or a failure of will, sometimes courts and agencies interpret stat-
utes in a manner unintended by the enacting Congress, and sometimes
courts and agencies interpret statutes in a manner that produces an undesir-
able result. In the broadest sense, these are all statutory mistakes.
How to solve such mistakes occupies much of the current judicial and
academic debate concerning statutory interpretation. Theories that empha-
size the statutory text and legislative intent are more likely to rely on
Congress-and Congress alone-to correct statutory mistakes. Theories
that consider other factors, such as current societal norms and congressional
preferences, are more likely to give courts and agencies a role in correcting
statutory mistakes. These more dynamic, less originalist theories justify
their reliance on courts and agencies to correct statutory mistakes in part
on the inability and unwillingness of Congress to correct its own mistakes
and the interpretative mistakes made by courts and agencies.
Enter Corrections Day. Credited (and discredited) as the brainchild of
Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich, Corrections Day offers an oppor-
tunity to prove the skeptics of Congress wrong. Gingrich conceived the
idea of a "corrections bill" in February 1995 as he listened to San Diego
Mayor Susan Golding complain about a regulatory burden imposed by the
Federal Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) via the Clean Water
Act.' He advanced his proposal a few days later to a group of Republican
governors, announcing it publicly after Vice President Al Gore spoke to
House Republicans about Gore's reinventing government proposals.
Gingrich proposed the regular scheduling of a day on which the House
would enact legislation designed to correct statutory mistakes.' As he first
envisioned it, Corrections Day would involve "as many as 20 or 30 correc-
tions acts a month ... that would each take care of something that was
passed that had an unintended consequence or that was peculiarly destruc-
tive in implementation."4 The matters addressed in those corrections acts
1. For a general description of these theories, see John Copeland Nagle, Newt Gingrich,
Dynamic Statutory Interpreter, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 2209, 2215-20 (1995).
2. See NEWT GINGRICH, To RENEW AMERICA 225-27 (1995). Actually, Michigan
Governor John Engler coined the term "Corrections Day" after Gingrich spoke about regulatory
reform at the February 1995 meeting with Republican governors. Id. at 227.
3. John H. Cushman, Jr., House to 'Correct' San Diego Sewage Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3,
1995, at BS.
4. Id. (quoting Speaker Gingrich).
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should be "the dumbest things the federal government's currently doing,"5
"items so dumb that you wouldn't want to tell your mom you were busy
doing it."' 6  Indeed, Gingrich added that an agency might find itself in
need of "correction" if too many of the individual statutory fixes came from
a particular agency.
Anything designed to "fix" what is happening in
Washington-especially a plan to correct the mistakes of federal bureaucrats
applying silly rules-is sure to excite the public imagination, and
Corrections Day is no exception. The idea proved wildly popular among
the public.' Gingrich encouraged state and local government officials, as
well as ordinary citizens, to submit their favorite examples of federal rules in
need of correction. Suggested candidates for Corrections Day-and lists of
suggestions-soon filled the newspapers, television, and congressional
5. Morning Edition: Report on San Diego's Fight with EPA over Sewage System (NPR broad-
cast, Feb. 17, 1995) (remarks of Speaker Gingrich); accord Newt Gingrich, Remarks at the
National League of Cities Conference at the Washington Hilton (Mar. 13, 1995).
6. Implementation of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Oversight and Investigations of the House Comm. on Commerce, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 129 (1995)
(testimony of California Governor Pete Wilson) (quoting Speaker Gingrich). For another stan-
dard of dumbness, see Progress Report with Newt Gingrich: Effect of Government Regulation on Small
Businesses (Progress and Freedom Foundation television broadcast, Feb. 7, 1995) (noting that
Corrections Day should address "something that your federal government is doing which is so
dumb that you would be embarrassed to explain to your children that you were paying taxes to
do").
7. See GINGRICH, supra note 2, at 228.
[I]f a department or agency comes up too often on Corrections Day, its oversight subcom-
mittee may decide to hold hearings on the agency's activities. If there is a clear track
record of not making sense or ignoring the facts of the local situation, then the com-
mittee may propose significant changes in the department or agency involved.... [l]f all
this fails, Congress can zero out an agency and bring in new people with new attitudes.
Id.
8. See, e.g., 141 CONG. REC. H6104 (daily ed. June 20, 1995) (statement of Rep. Solomon)
(observing that Corrections Day has "captured the imagination and enthusiastic support of our
colleagues and the American people alike"); GINGRICH, sura note 2, at 227 (commenting that
"[tihe enthusiasm [for Corrections Day] is overwhelming"). One editorial gushed that
"[piroviding machinery for clearing the enormous, noxious weeds out of the fields of legislation
planted over the years could turn out to be one of this century's most positive congressional
reforms." Fixing 'Dumb' Laws, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, May 2, 1995, at A6. For other examples of
editorial support, see A Positive Plan to Reduce Bad Government Regulations, LANCASTER NEW ERA
(Pennsylvania), June 22, 1995, at A10; Corrections Day, WASH. POST, May 6, 1995, at A14;
Corrections Day: House Practice Would Be Welcome Change, TELEGRAM & GAZETTE (Worchester,
Mass.), July 5, 1995, at A6; 'Corrections Day' House Takes Aim at Bad Rules, Regulations,
COLUMBUS DISPATCH, July 30, 1995, at 2B. The dissenters are cited infra at text accompanying
note 11.
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offices.9 The idea spread to the Illinois House of Representatives, which
created its own "Common Sense Legislation" initiative patterned after the
Federal Corrections Day. l"
But not everyone was pleased. Corrections Day drew skeptical re-
actions from professors, environmentalists, and some Democrats in
Congress.1" The complaints increased as the House held two hearings to
design the actual process to be employed on Corrections Day. 2 In June
1995, the House created a special calendar to govern floor consideration of
Corrections Day legislation, but it did so over substantial Democratic objec-
tions and without a clearly defined system for identifying which bills were
eligible to be considered on Corrections Day. The inauspicious debut of
Corrections Day in July 1995 caused more people (including some prior
supporters) to question its utility. 3 The critics viewed Corrections Day as
a forum for special interests to dismantle substantive federal law in the
name of "corrections." In short, after watching the House march through
9. For lists of statutes and regulations proposed for correction, see, e.g., 141 CONG. REC.
H6109 (daily ed. June 20, 1995) (statement of Rep. Collins) (inserting "Correction Inventory" of
32 statutes and regulations); GINGRICH, supra note 2, at 227 (describing "a ten-page, single-
spaced list of specific proposals for the first Corrections Day" submitted by Illinois Governor Jim
Edgar); Readers See Plenty of Government Excess, PEORIA J. STAR (I11.), May 4, 1995, at All
(reporting results of telephone calls proposing candidates for Corrections Day).
10. See Dan Rutherford, Rutherford's Common Sense Legislation Passes House (Feb. 8,
1996) (news release, on file with author) (reporting that the Illinois House has passed legislation
"which would completely eliminate acts or amendatorily downsize 21 Acts of Illinois Law"). A
local newspaper editorial apparently prompted the Illinois Legislature to develop its procedure.
Compare 'Corrections Day Calendar' to Sweep Stupid Rules/Laws, THE PANTAGRAPH (Bloomington,
11.), July 11, 1995, at A6 (calling for analogous state Corrections Day) with State to Focus on
Eliminating "Stupid" Laws, THE PANTAGRAPH (Bloomington, 111.), Aug. 6, 1995, at A7 (reporting
that the Illinois House planned to institute such a procedure).
11. See, e.g., Harold Krent & Jim Rossi, Avoiding a Mistake with "Corrections Day," CHI.
TRIB., Mar. 9, 1995, § 1, at 23, reprinted in LEGAL TIMES, Apr. 3, 1995, at 22; see also infra text
accompanying notes 162-204 (describing objections to Corrections Day).
12. See Corrections Day Calendar: Hearing on H. Res. 161 Before the House Rules Comm.,
104th Cong., 1st Sess. (forthcoming 1996) [hereinafter Corrections Day Calendar Hearing] (tran-
script on file with author); Corrections Day Repeal of Regulations: Joint Hearing Before the House
Subcomm. on National Economic Growth, Natural Resources, and Regulatory Affairs and the House
Subcomm. on Rules and Organization of the House, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) [hereinafter
Corrections Day Repeal of Regulations Hearing].
13. By the summer of 1995, several editorials questioned the Corrections Day procedure
being developed by the House. See, e.g., Beware of Corrections Day, BuFF. NEWS, July 30, 1995,
at 8F; House's Quick-Fix Rule Could Kill Worthy Laws, THE TENNESSEAN (Nashville), June 25,
1995, at 40; Hurry, Hurry, Hurry, FORT WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, June 23, 1995, at A30; Newt
Watch, NEW REPUBLIC, May 22, 1995, at 10; Overboard: Don't Overdo it in Zeal to Mend Federal
Rules, Hous. CHRON., July 18, 1995, at A16. The Washington Post reversed its position after the
House held its first Corrections Day. Compare Not Much of a Correction, WASH. POST, July 27,
1995, at A18 with Corrections Day, supra note 8, at A14.
the Contract with America, the critics distrusted Gingrich and the House
Republicans he led.
My thesis is that Corrections Day is a great idea in theory, and a work-
able idea in practice. Congress, administrative agencies, and courts all
make mistakes when drafting, implementing, and interpreting statutes, yet
only Congress has full authority to remedy all these mistakes. Corrections
Day also fulfills the longstanding congressional desire to exercise better
control over the implementation of the statutes Congress enacts. Neither
the regular legislative process, nor oversight hearings, nor any other exist-
ing tool for fine-tuning statutory schemes have been capable of enabling
Congress to keep up with the application of existing laws. Corrections Day
provides Congress with a regular opportunity to fix statutory mistakes in a
way that is faithful to the constitutional responsibilities of the legislature,
the executive, and the judiciary.
Part I of this Article describes the problem of statutory mistakes: what
they are, and who makes them. Part II explains that statutory mistakes do
exist, regardless of how one defines "mistake." Congress, agencies, and the
courts all make mistakes, though the responsibility for them ultimately
resides with Congress, the author of the statute. Part III examines how
Congress has tried to correct statutory mistakes through the periodic re-
authorization of statutes, appropriations riders, using subsequent legislative
history to signal approval or disapproval of an interpretation of a statute,
informal pressure exerted through agency oversight hearings, and such
statutory amendments as Congress is able to enact. The inadequacy of
these existing congressional procedures operates as a central premise suppor-
ting the theories of statutory interpretation that rely on the courts and
agencies to correct statutory mistakes.
Part IV first explains how the push for a congressional procedure to
correct statutory mistakes puts Newt Gingrich in distinguished company.
In a 1987 article, Justice Ginsburg called for "an alert system through
which Congress could become activated to clear up mysteries it has written
into federal legislation,"' 14 echoing similar proposals advanced by Judge
Friendly,15 Justice Cardozo, 16 and Roscoe Pound17 before her. Part IV
14. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, A Plea for Legislative Review, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 995, 997 (1987);
see also Ruth Bader Ginsburg & Peter Huber, The Intercircuit Committee, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1417
(1986).
15. Henry J. Friendly, The Gap in Lawmaking-Judges Who Can't and Legislators Who Won't,
63 COLUM. L. REV. 787 (1963).
16. Benjamin N. Cardozo, A Ministry of Justice, 35 HARV. L. REV. 113 (1921).
17. Roscoe Pound, Anachronisms in Law, 3 J. AM. JUDICATURE SOC'Y 142, 146 (1920).
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then describes the Corrections Day procedure established by the House and
how it worked on the seven Corrections Days held through February 1996.
This review demonstrates that the principal objections to Corrections Day
are misplaced and that the concerns that do merit attention can be readily
accommodated.
Finally, Part V outlines the ramifications of Corrections Day for theo-
ries and doctrines of statutory interpretation that assume that Congress
cannot or will not correct statutory mistakes. Corrections Day supports one
of the fundamental premises of textualist theories of statutory inter-
pretation: Courts and agencies need not (and indeed should not) attempt to
correct statutory mistakes under the guise of statutory interpretation
because Congress can fix its own mistakes."8 Conversely, theories of statu-
tory interpretation that look beyond the statutory text and legislative intent
object that Congress lacks the institutional competence to track how all of
the statutes it has enacted are being implemented and that it is unrealistic
to expect Congress to update federal statutes to account for new develop-
ments or to correct prior mistakes. Agencies and courts, the argument
continues, must fix statutory mistakes lest they go uncorrected. If, how-
ever, Congress can readily amend statutes when a mistake is identified,
then Corrections Day will undermine the case for theories of statutory
interpretation that look beyond the statutory text or legislative intent.
Corrections Day could also raise questions about the way in which courts
address legislative history, arguments that Congress has acquiesced in a
prior interpretation of a statute, and stare decisis. Even the limitations of
the new procedure fail to undermine the case that Corrections Day makes
for theories of statutory interpretation that rely on Congress to correct
statutory mistakes.
I. WHAT NEEDS TO BE CORRECTED
The obvious, albeit unstated, premise of Corrections Day is that mis-
takes are being made that need to be corrected. Much of the controversy
18. See, e.g., Earl M. Maltz, Rhetoric and Reality in the Theory of Statutory Interpretation:
Underenforcement, Overenforcement, and the Problem of Legislative Supremacy, 71 B.U. L. REV. 767,
782 (1991).
Subject to only constitutional constraints, legislatures have the authority to make rules of
law. An integral part of that authority is the right to make mistakes-even mistakes that
the legislators who passed the statute might later come to regret. If legislative supremacy
means anything significant, those mistakes must be corrected not by the courts but by
future legislatures.
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surrounding recent statutory interpretation cases reflects different beliefs
about the nature of statutory mistakes and who should be correcting them.
But statutory mistakes exist under every theory of statutory interpretation,
and each branch of the federal government can make them. The justified
dissatisfaction with the current congressional procedures for correcting
statutory mistakes leads some to turn to the agencies and the courts to solve
the problem, but it has led others to propose congressional solutions that
have now blossomed into Corrections Day.
A. The Existence of Statutory Mistakes
Consider several views of the nature of statutory mistakes. Textualists
learn the meaning of a statute from statutory text alone. Any inter-
pretation contrary to the meaning of that text, therefore, is mistaken-even
if other sources suggest that Congress actually intended something else.' 9
Originalists who search for the intent of the Congress that enacted the
statute, by contrast, are more willing to displace the statutory text when
other evidence of legislative intent leads to a different result. Fidelity to
the statutory text can thus sometimes produce a mistaken interpretation of
the statute. 0
Dynamic statutory interpreters are less likely to find statutory mistakes
because they disavow any single correct interpretation of a statute." A
dynamic statutory interpreter who sees the process of the congressional
enactment of statutes, the administrative implementation of statutes, and
the judicial interpretation of statutes as an ongoing exercise may view any
response by one institution (e.g., Congress) as a way of expressing its prefer-
ence for a different result than that preferred by another institution (e.g., an
agency or a court). So viewed, there are no "mistakes" involved, only a
series of responses by a number of institutional actors.22 But dynamic
statutory interpreters judge the interpretation of a statute partially on the
justice of the normative result it yields, so that a statutory mistake occurs
when Congress enacts an unjust statute or when an interpreter produces an
unjust result. Likewise, to the extent that dynamic statutory interpreters
consult the desires of the current Congress and President and not just the
19. See infra text accompanying notes 38-42.
20. Id.
21. See Nagle, supra note 1, at 2218-19.
22. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Foreword: Law as Equilibrium, 108
HARV. L. REv. 26, 28-29 (1994).
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enacting bodies, a statutory provision that conflicts with those current
desires can be viewed as a mistake.
Suppose that all of these can be counted as statutory mistakes, 3 even
though the definitions of "statutory mistake" are mutually exclusive. If it is
possible to construct a mechanism that will correct all statutory mistakes,
no matter how they are defined, then the contested view of what consti-
tutes a statutory mistake vanishes as an obstacle to correcting such mis-
takes. Therefore, my working definition of "statutory mistake" includes
any provision that the current Congress determines to be in need of revi-
sion, regardless of the reason why.
B. Identifying Who Makes Statutory Mistakes
Accepting the existence of statutory mistakes does not indicate how
such mistakes happen. Three possibilities exist: There can be legislative
mistakes (Congress wrote the statute incorrectly), administrative mistakes
(the agency misapplied the statute), and judicial mistakes (the court inter-
preted the statute incorrectly). Although much of the current congres-
sional support for Corrections Day presumes that agency mistakes present
the greatest problem, 24 and much of the academic literature has focused
on congressional responses to apparent judicial mistakes in statutory inter-
pretation, I maintain that all three kinds of mistakes ultimately collapse
into a mistake by Congress.
23. I have explained my disagreement with dynamic statutory interpretation elsewhere. See
Nagle, supra note 1, at 2220-50.
24. See infra text accompanying notes 32-37.
25. See, e.g., James J. Brudney, Congressional Commentary on Judicial Interpretations of
Statutes: Idle Chatter or Telling Response?, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1994); William N. Eskridge, Jr.,
Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331 (1991) [hereinafter
Eskridge, Overriding Supreme Court]; William N. Eskridge, Jr., Reneging on History? Playing the
Court/Congress/President Civil Rights Game, 79 CAL. L. REV. 613 (1991) [hereinafter Eskridge,
Reneging on History]; Roger Handberg & Harold F. Hill, Jr., Court Curbing, Court Reversals, and
Judicial Review: The Supreme Court Versus Congress, 14 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 309 (1980); Beth M.
Henschen, Statutory Interpretations of the Supreme Court: Congressional Response, 11 AM. POL. Q.
441, 443 (1983); Beth M. Henschen & Edward I. Sidlow, The Supreme Court and the Congressional
Agenda-Setting Process, 5 J.L. & POL. 685 (1989); Abner J. Mikva & Jeff Bleich, When Congress
Overrules the Court, 79 CAL. L. REV. 729 (1991); Michael E. Solimine & James L. Walker, The
Next Word: Congressional Response to Supreme Court Statutory Decisions, 65 TEMP. L. REV. 425
(1992); Harry P. Stumpf, Congressional Response to Supreme Court Rulings: The Interaction of Law
and Politics, 14 J. PUB. L. 377 (1965); Note, Congressional Reversals of Supreme Court Decisions:
1945-1957,71 HARV. L. REV. 1324 (1958).
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1. Congressional Mistakes
Congress may have made a mistake when it originally wrote a statute
using language that failed to achieve its goals. The example offered by Vice
President Gore on the day that the. idea for Corrections Day was
announced is illustrative. Federal law authorizes funding for local govern-
ments who use dogs to locate illegal drugs. Portland, Oregon had experi-
enced great success in finding drugs when it deployed its secret weapon:
Harley the Pig. But Harley was not a dog. Nonetheless, Vice President
Gore redefined Harley to be a dog, thus qualifying Portland for the federal
drug enforcement money. 6 Gore recognized that his solution was inade-
quate, though, and he offered it as an example when he spoke to Republi-
can House members about reinventing government. Gingrich seized the
story as an example of what could be done on Corrections Day.
7
A statutory mistake can also include a statute that worked when
enacted but which no longer fulfills its original goal due to charged circum-
stances. For example, a Louisiana statute provides that a man is the
"natural father" of a child only if the man is alive when the child is con-
ceived."8  All other states have similar statutes. In Hart v. Shalala,9 Ed
Hart contributed his sperm at a fertility clinic, he died of cancer a few
months later, and then his wife Nancy conceived a child after being artifi-
cially inseminated by her deceased husband's sperm. Judith Hart was born
in June 1991, but she was denied survivor's benefits because the state law
does not acknowledge her as her father's heir. The Louisiana Legislature
could not have anticipated the birth of children through artificial insemina-
tion when it enacted the law years ago, but the statute continues to govern
26. See Al Gore, Remarks by Vice President Al Gore to the Democratic Leadership Council
Forum at the Sheraton Washington (Dec. 6, 1994) (explaining how "with the authority vested in
me as vice president of the United States ... I declared Harley a dog"); see also 141 CONG. REC.
Sil,737 (daily ed. Aug. 7, 1995) (statement of Sen. Packwood) (retelling the story in support of
legislation to relieve states of federal mandates).
27. See Norm Brewer, Gingrich Uses Gore's Pig to Explain "Corrections Day," SEATTLE TIMES,
Feb. 2, 1995, at A8. For other examples of statutes written unintentionally broadly or narrowly,
see 140 CONG. REC. H6101 (daily ed. July 21, 1994) (statement of Rep. Rohrabacher) (statute
prohibiting mechanized vehicles in wilderness areas except in life-threatening emergencies pre-
vented the Forest Service from rescuing a Boy Scout lost in the New Mexico wilderness). See
infra notes 122-126 and accompanying text (vegetable oil covered by the Oil Pollution Act).
28. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 40:34(B)(1)(a)(iv) (West 1992 & Supp. 1995).
29. No. 94-3944 (E.D. La. filed Dec. 12, 1994). The case is described in Mark Curriden, No
Benefits for 'Miracle' Baby, A.B.A. J., Mar. 1995, at 18.
Corrections Day 1275
1276 43 UCLA LAw REVIEW 1267 (1996)
all births today. Thus the child's mother sued to have the courts invalidate
the law, claiming that the statute is outdated in a day of artificial insemina-
tion. The question divided the Social Security Administration until the
Commissioner intervened to award benefits to the Harts while the broader
legal issue could be studied.30  Debates about the appropriate definition of
"father" in an age of artificial insemination demonstrate the need for legis-
lative reconsideration of the statute.31
2. Agency Mistakes
Alternately, an agency may have made a mistake in implementing the
statute, so that Congress is dissatisfied with the result produced by the
statute it enacted. Members of Congress often complain about an agency's
"misinterpretation" of a federal statute.32 Many of the House Republicans
30. See Alan Sayre, Girl Conceived After Dad's Death Gets Benefits, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Mar.
12, 1996, at 16 (quoting Social Security Commissioner Shirley Chater as stating that "[riecent
advances in modern medical practice, particularly in the field of reproductive medicine, necessi-
tate a careful review of current laws and regulations to ensure they are equitable in awarding
Social Security payments in cases such as this"). The Commissioner reversed an administrative
appeals council decision that itself had reversed an administrative law judge who had ruled that
Mr. Hart is Judith's father notwithstanding the Louisiana statute. See Janet McConnaughey, No
Benefits for a Life After Death: Social Security Denied Child from Stored Sperm, CIN. ENQ., Dec. 1,
1995, at A14.
31. For example, the Harts' attorney "plan[ned] to show, using this set of facts, logic and
reason, that the law is outdated and must be put aside." Curriden, supra note 29, at 18 (quoting
William Rittenberg). On the other hand, some have objected to changing the law. See Kimberly
Crockett, Child Conceived with Dead Father's Sperm Now Wants His Legacy, SACRAMENTO BEE,
June 7, 1995, at B7 ("For a widow to artificially inseminate herself with her late husband's
sperm-because this is what they wanted-is one thing. It's a personal choice. To ask for bene-
fits is another. This act is just as irresponsible as the teenager who gets pregnant to receive wel-
fare. Neither should be compensated."); NBC News Sunday Today: New Technology Allowing
Children to Be Born to Deceased Fathers Through Artificial Insemination Raises Legal Questions (NBC
television broadcast, Jan. 29, 1995) (quoting a Louisiana Civil Code expert who defends the
existing statute because "there has to be a cutting-off point to determine inheritance rights").
For another example of an allegedly outdated law, see infra notes 131-134 (describing debate
concerning 1954 regulation prohibiting teenagers from operating paper balers in grocery stores).
32. See, e.g., 141 CONG. REC. E1477 (daily ed. July 20, 1995) (statement of Rep. Smith)
(accusing the State Department of misinterpreting a statute protecting American longshore jobs);
id.at H6113 (daily ed. June 20, 1995) (statement of Rep. Bereuter) (describing how the Depart-
ment of Housing and Urban Development "wilfully flaunted congressional intent" in its interpre-
tation of the water purification requirements of the Housing and Community Development Act
of 1987); id. at H4597 (daily ed. May 9, 1995) (statement of Rep. Hastert) (accusing the Depart-
ment of Education of misinterpreting the provisions of Title IX of the Civil Rights Act regarding
gender equality in athletics); id. at E590 (daily ed. Mar. 14, 1995) (statement of Rep. Fawell)
(introducing legislation to overturn the Department of Labor's misinterpretation of the Portal-to-
Portal Act and the Fair Labor Standards Act as applied to commuters); 140 id. at H6239 (daily
ed. July 26, 1994) (statement of Rep. Mica) (objecting to EPA's interpretation of statutes govern-
ing risk assessment and complaining that "Congress enacts laws, and the agencies get hold of
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supporting Corrections Day emphasize the need to correct agency mistakes.
Some have even suggested that bringing such mistakes to light will be
adequate, even if correcting legislation is never enacted. Remember that a
primary purpose of Corrections Day is to increase the accountability of the
administrative process to Congress, a goal Congress has pursued through a
variety of avenues with varying success.33
But the proponents of Corrections Day realize that some agency mis-
takes result from the nature of the statute being implemented. An agency
may be forced to take a certain position because it is bound by the appli-
cable statutory language.34 In other cases, Congress disapproves of an
agency's application of general statutory language in a case that Congress
failed to anticipate. Complaints about the "one-size-fits-all" character of
federal legislation fueled the call for Corrections Day.35 Some of these
those laws, and they misinterpret them"); 138 id. at S 11,065 (daily ed. July 31, 1992) (statement
of Sen. Pressler) (accusing the State Department of licensing arms sales to Pakistan in violation of
the Pressler Amendment to the Arms Export Control Act); id. at H2424-25 (daily ed. Apr. 8,
1992) (statements of Reps. Poshard & Bereuter) (charging that EPA misinterpreted the provisions
of the Clean Air Act encouraging the use of ethanol fuels).
33. The debate over regulatory reform legislation describes many of these methods of con-
gressional control over agency decisionmaking. See generally William W. Buxbee, Regulatory
Reform or Statutory Muddle: The "Legislative Mirage" of Single Statute Regulatory Reform, 5 N.Y.U.
ENVTL. L.J. (forthcoming Spring 1996) (discussing regulatory reform proposals in the 104th
Congress).
34. For examples of proponents of Corrections Day and advocates of specific statutory
amendments recognizing that some agency mistakes result from an agency being bound by the
applicable statutory language, see "Corrections Day" Bills: Hearing Before the House Subcomm. on
Workforce Protections of the Comm. on Economic and Educational Opportunities, 104th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1995), available in LEXIS, Legis Library, CNGTST File [hereinafter Corrections Day Bills
Hearing] (testimony of Paula Laws, President-Elect, National Court Reporters Association) (sup-
porting a legislative reversal of a provision of the Fair Labor Standards Act because "the
Department of Labor feels bound by the provisions of the statute" and commenting that "[t]he
Department has been cooperative and sympathetic, but has not been able to provide any relief");
H.R. REP. No. 387, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995), available in LEXIS, Legis Library, CMTRPT
File (noting that congressional hearings had raised serious questions about EPA's ability to waive
or ignore the controversial Clean Air Act carpooling requirements); 141 CONG. REC. H9754
(daily ed. Oct. 10, 1995) (statement of Rep. De La Garza) (recognizing that vegetable oil was
subject to the Oil Pollution Act because "Congress did not differentiate between the various
types of oil in the legislative language"); Equal Time (CNBC television broadcast, June 23, 1995)
(Rep. McIntosh acknowledging in interview that sometimes agencies cannot change a regulation
"because Congress has actually passed a law that requires those stupid regulations"); Text of House
Speaker's Daily News Conference (CNN television broadcast, Feb. 1, 1995) (Speaker Gingrich
describing Corrections Day as aimed at federal policies "which we need to stop doing, but may
be, currently, legally required by law to do").
35. See Corrections Day Bills Hearing, supra note 34 (testimony of Rep. Vucanovich); 141
CONG. REC. H7570 (daily ed. July 25, 1995) (statement of Rep. McIntosh); 141 CONG. REC.
H61 10 (daily ed. June 20, 1995) (statement of Rep. Goss); see also id. at H7573 (daily ed. July 25,
1995) (statement of Rep. Bilbray) (citing a 1993 National Academy of Sciences report concluding
that the uniform national requirements of the Clean Water Act have failed to address regional
federal statutes, however, were written in this manner precisely because
Congress wanted a uniform national standard with no local discrepan-
cies.36 More frequently, Congress enacts general legislation and relies on
the agency to apply the statute in particular situations. Such general legis-
lation can reflect trust in the administrative process, but it can also reflect
congressional unwillingness to grapple with the difficult issues raised by a
statute.
Whatever the initial explanation, an agency that makes the hard
decision and applies the statute in a controversial situation can expect to be
criticized by the very members of Congress who drafted the law. On the
other hand, a coy agency may decline to state whether it promulgated a
regulation because of an unavoidable Statutory command or because of a
deliberate agency policy choice-though that strategy collapses once
Congress investigates the source of the agency's rule.
3 7
3. Judicial Mistakes
That leaves the courts. The courts may have made a mistake in inter-
preting the statute, so that Congress must rewrite the statute to achieve the
goal it desires. Congress frequently complains that the courts have wrongly
interpreted the statutes it has enacted.3" Such criticisms are most powerful
when they indicate the court's decision is contrary to the intent of the
Congress that enacted the statute. For example, as a result of the Supreme
Court's increasing use of clear statement rules requiring explicit statutory
language to accomplish certain purposes and refusing to look at other evi-
variations in environmental systems or to respond to changing conditions).
36. See, e.g., 141 CONG. REc. H7565 (daily ed. July 25, 1995) (statement of Rep. Mineta)
(explaining that Congress specifically chose national rather than local standards when it enacted
the sewage treatment requirements of the Clean Water Act in 1972).
37. See Sen. Faircloth Launches Attack on EPA's Clean Air Act Implementation, INSIDE E.P.A.,
July 14, 1995, at 10 (describing letter from Senator Faircloth to EPA that "repeatedly questions
whether controversial clean air rules are required by the statute, or if they are a result of EPA's
interpretation of its own authority").
38. See, e.g., 141 CONG. REc. E74 (daily ed. Jan. 11, 1995) (statement of Rep. Orton) (asser-
ting that a Pennsylvania state court decision denying a bank's power to collect credit card
charges from Pennsylvania residents misinterpreted the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and
Branching Act of 1994); id. at S520 (daily ed. Jan. 5, 1995) (statements of Sens. Bennett & Roth)
(same); 140 id. at H7040 (daily ed. Aug. 5, 1994) (statement of Rep. Fields) (arguing that federal
court congressional redistricting decisions misinterpreted the Voting Rights Act); 139 id. at
H8960-63 (daily ed. Nov. 9, 1993) (statements of Reps. Williams, Ford, & Berman) (accusing
federal courts of misinterpreting the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 to pre-
empt certain state laws); 138 id. at S2948-49 (daily ed. Mar. 10, 1992) (statement of Sen. Garn)
(charging that a federal district court misinterpreted a recent amendment to the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation Improvement Act).
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dence of legislative intent, Congress protests that it has had to repeatedly
amend the same statutory provision in order to effectuate its original
intent.39 Congress also blames the courts with misreading a statute when
an interpretation has become accepted in the community even if that inter-
pretation does not necessarily reflect the intent of the enacting Congress.
The criticisms of the Court in the aftermath of the 1988 Term's civil rights
decisions are best explained in this way.' ° In other cases a court misinter-
prets a statute because Congress used ambiguous language that failed to
convey congressional intent.
41
These examples show that the characterization of a judicial statutory
mistake depends on the chosen method of statutory interpretation. As
noted above, if a court is supposed to ascertain and give effect to con-
gressional intent, a decision that is contrary to what the enacting Congress
intended is incorrect. A court that views its role differently can expect to
be accused of making statutory mistakes. A textualist court that adheres to
the statutory text even if the legislative history suggests a different con-
gressional purpose may face this criticism.42 A dynamic court that con-
siders current social norms and congressional attitudes may also be criticized
for neglecting congressional intent, albeit not by the current congressional
majority whose views a dynamic statutory interpreter gives weight.
Statutory mistakes are thus more common if the interpreter and Congress
have a different view of how to interpret statutes, but the difficult cases
39. I describe the sequence of judicial interpretations and statutory amendments of the
Clean Water Act in John Copeland Nagle, Waiving Sovereign Immunity in an Age of Clear
Statement Rules, 1995 WiS. L. REV. 771 (1995). William Eskridge describes a similar saga under
the Education of the Handicapped Act in WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION 284-85 (1994).
40. The 1989 Term's civil rights decisions, and the congressional reaction to them, are
detailed in Eskridge, Reneging on History, supra note 25, at 633-41; Mikva & Bleich, supra note
25, at 740-43.
41. See Mikva & Bleich, supra note 25, at 730-31. To put it another way, a court may
interpret a statute against the original legislative intent or simply beyond that intent. See Daniel
A. Farber, Statutory Interpretation and Legislative Supremacy, 78 GEO. L.J. 281, 282 (1989); see also
ESKRIDGE, supra note 39, at 48-49.
42. The 1988 Term's civil rights decisions and other recent interactions between the
Supreme Court and Congress demonstrate this point. See Eskridge, Reneging on History, supra
note 25, at 677 (suggesting that "the new textualism signals that the Court ... is willing to
tolerate tension between itself and Congress"); Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 22, at 75 (conclud-
ing that "the textualist opinions openly invite legislative revision"); Steven R. Greenberger, Civil
Rights and the Politics of Statutory Interpretation, 62 U. COLO. L. REV. 37, 68 (1991) ("[T]he deci-
sions Congress is taking issue with do not involve a misreading of legislative history. To the
contrary, it is the textualist approach that Congress is rejecting."); Solimine & Walker, supra
note 25, at 448 (concluding from an empirical study that "a disproportionate number of over-
ridden cases used a 'plain meaning' analysis").
presented under any theory of statutory interpretation mean that statutory
mistakes can occur under any system.
All of these mistakes-even those made by courts or agencies-are
ultimately the result of a congressional mistake. Most cases that cause
courts and agencies to struggle are those where Congress has failed to
clearly express its intention in the statutory language. Indeed, the courts
complain of ambiguous statutory language daily.43 Some mistakes occur
when Congress did not foresee all the situations that would be covered by
the statutory language. Or Congress may fail to update a statute to recog-
nize developments in technology or other changed circumstances. Finally,
courts may conclude that a statute produces an undesirable result, whether
or not the courts then feel free to correct the problem themselves. All
statutory mistakes, therefore, can be attributed to Congress being sloppy,
unthinking, neglectful, or wrong.
44
II. WAYS OF CORRECTING STATUTORY MISTAKES
Congress has followed a number of other avenues for fixing statutory
mistakes. These solutions include (1) relying on the general legislative
process to enact such statutory amendments as Congress sees fit, (2) amend-
ing statutes when they are reauthorized, (3) adding substantive statutory
provisions to appropriations legislation, (4) producing legislative history
approving or disapproving the interpretation of a statute, and (5) informally
overseeing and pressuring agency officials. The failure of these methods,
individually and collectively, to correct many statutory mistakes has been
cited in support of theories allowing judicial and administrative corrections
of statutes.
43. To take only a few recent examples, see National Ass'n of Regulatory Util. Comm'rs v.
SEC, 63 F.3d 1123, 1126-27 (D.C. Cir. 1995); Borkowski v. Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 63 F.3d
131, 139 (2d Cir. 1995); Jane L. v. Bangerter, 61 F.3d 1493, 1501 (10th Cir. 1995); Akindemowo
v. INS, 61 F.3d 282, 286-87 (4th Cir. 1995). That is not to say that all statutory language is
ambiguous. See Nagle, supra note 1, at 2222-24, 2226.
44. With two exceptions: If the consequences of a statute were unforeseeable-not just
unforeseen-when Congress enacted the statute, then Congress cannot be blamed for a problem
it could not have anticipated. Likewise, if Congress wrote a statute when one rule of statutory
interpretation applied, and then the courts announced a new rule that produced a different result,
Congress cannot be blamed for such "bait-and-switch" tactics.
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A. Congressional Methods of Correcting Statutory Mistakes
Congress corrects many statutory mistakes. Recent studies have
demonstrated that Congress is increasingly aware of judicial interpretations
of statutes and that Congress often moves to correct interpretations with
which it disagrees. 45 Nonetheless, it is widely argued that Congress does
not fix as many statutory mistakes as it should.
1. Statutory Amendments
Congress often enacts statutes through its regular legislative process
that correct statutory mistakes. Indeed, "[alll lawmaking, strictly speaking,
is corrective. "46 For example, much specific environmental legislation
responds to what Congress faults as agency and court misinterpretations of
existing statutes. 47 Existing procedures such as suspension of the rules or
proceeding under unanimous consent allow Congress to consider proposed
legislation on an expedited schedule. 4 But many admitted statutory mis-
takes remain uncorrected. Moreover, the corrections that do occur are
45. See Eskridge, Overriding Supreme Court, supra note 25, at 424-42 (collecting statutes
overriding federal court interpretations of federal statutes between 1967 and 1990); Solimine &
Walker, supra note 25, at 454-58 (listing statutes responding to Supreme Court decisions); see also
Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 599 (1983) (noting that "Congress can and
often does correct" mistaken executive statutory interpretations).
46. Corrections Day Calendar Hearing, supra note 12 (statement of Dr. Roger H. Davidson);
accord United States v. Carlton, 114 S. Ct. 2018, 2025 (1994) (O'Connor, J., concurring in the
judgment) ("Every law touching on an area in which Congress has previously legislated can be
said to serve the legislative purpose of fixing a perceived problem with the prior state of affairs-
there is no reason to pass a new law, after all, if the legislators are satisfied with the old one.");
141 CONG. REC. H6112 (daily ed. June 20, 1995) (statement of Rep. Mineta) (noting that "[sluch
legislative corrections have been part of this Congress' activity for almost as long as there has
been a Congress"); id. at H6114 (statement of Rep. Beilenson) (noting that "presumably every bill
we pass around here is a correction of one sort or another, or an improvement of one kind or
another on existing laws or regulations").
47. As Michael Herz observes, "Congress and EPA have had a running battle since the late
1970s.... In addition, sophisticated, particularized, and well-funded interests on all sides of the
issues distrust EPA and strive to insert favorable language into new legislation." Michael Herz,
Judicial Textualism Meets Congressional Micromanagement: A Potential Collision in Clean Air Act
Interpretation, 16 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 175, 179-80 (1992).
48. See Corrections Day Repeal of Regulations Hearing, supra note 12, at 67-69 (testimony of
William R. Pitts, Jr.) (former House official describing the various procedures under the House
rules for specific classes of proposed legislation).
often random, or conversely, dependent on who has the greatest access to
Congress. William Eskridge, for example, has demonstrated that certain
groups have much greater success in convincing Congress to overturn
the Supreme Court's interpretation of a statute than other groups. 49
Congress, in turn, often relies on specialized statutory and informal mea-
sures to express its discontent with an agency's or court's interpretation of a
statute.
2. The Reauthorization Process
Congress amends statutes when they are reauthorized. Many statutes
are authorized for a specified period, usually between two and five years.
Thus, most statutory amendments are collected and enacted in an omnibus
bill when Congress reauthorizes the statute.50  The advantage of this
approach lies in the ability to bundle amendments favored by different, and
sometimes opposing, parties. Many reauthorization bills contain provisions
that reflect a compromise among different interests.51 Of course, most
statutes-not just reauthorization bills-embody compromises among com-
peting groups, but the need to compromise is greater when existing legisla-
tion will expire absent a compromise.52
The disadvantage lies in the legislative inertia that blocks amendments
that have no significant opposition. If a statute is coming up for reauthori-
zation in three years, that can operate as a disincentive against acting to
solve a particular problem now. Moreover, Congress often reauthorizes a
49. ESKRIDGE, supra note 39, at 153 (indicating which groups have greatest access, moderate
access, and little access to Congress to override Supreme Court decisions).
50. The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685 (1977), and
1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399 (1990), the Superfund Amendments and Reauthoriza-
tion Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986), and the Clean Water Act
Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1566 (1977), are notable examples of this
procedure.
51. See, e.g., Harold H. Bruff, Presidential Management of Rulemaking, 57 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 533, 594 n.362 (1989) (describing compromise resolving an attempt to defund the Office of
Information and Regulatory Affairs of the Office of Management and Budget); Paula Galowitz,
Restrictions on Lobbying by Legal Services Attorneys: Redefining Professional Norms and Obligations, 4
B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 39, 55-57 & n.87 (1994) (outlining congressional compromise that resulted
in a 1984 appropriations rider restricting the activities of the Legal Services Corporation); Bradley
K. Steinbrecher, Note, The Impact of the Clinton Administration's Export Promotion Plan on U.S.
Exports of Computers and High-Technology Equipment, 15 U. PA. J. INT'L BuS. L. 675, 678-79 n.19
(1995) (describing attempted compromise legislation to reauthorize the Export Administration
Act of 1979).
52. See Corrections Day Repeal of Regulations Hearing, supra note 12, at 67 (testimony of
William R. Pitts, Jr.) (former House official asserting that "the best way to ensure enactment is to
be part of legislation that must be enacted by some scheduled deadline").
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statute on a year-to-year basis when it cannot agree to a comprehensive
reauthorization package. The best recent illustration of this phenomenon
concerns the failed effort to reauthorize the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) in 1994. Environ-
mentalists, industry, and other interested parties reached a compromise
agreement on many issues that fell apart when some in Congress insisted on
making all CERCLA cleanup projects subject to the labor requirements of
the Davis-Bacon Act.5 3  That failure prevented a number of noncontro-
versial amendments from being enacted. A group of provisions intended to
address the problem of "brownfields"-abandoned, contaminated sites in
urban areas which no developer will purchase because of the specter of
CERCLA liability-was acceptable to all sides of the debate, but the insis-
tence on an all-or-nothing amendment approach keeps such sites prohibi-
tively unattractive to potential inner-city developers.54 Recognizing that
such examples are common, some proponents of Corrections Day have
argued that a new procedure is needed precisely because the reauthorization
process produces a disincentive to quickly correct mistakes.55
3. Appropriations Riders
When committees fail to approve desired legislation, members of
Congress frequently turn to the appropriations process to make substantive
statutory changes. This is especially true for corrections. Appropriations
riders attaching substantive changes in the law to appropriations bills com-
monly respond to a court or agency decision that Congress views as mis-
taken. 56  The recent congressional tendency to bundle many discrete
issues into an omnibus continuing resolution funding the entire govern-
53. See Environmental Bills in Congress, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 12, 1994, at B7. George Will's
solution is to use Corrections Day to repeal the Davis-Bacon Act, see George Will, Davis-Bacon a
Good Place for Corrections Day to Start, FT. LAUDERDALE SUN-SENTINEL, Feb. 12, 1995, at 7G,
but that statute lacks the characteristics of a corrections bill described infra at text accompanying
notes 199-201.
54. For an explanation of how CERCLA operates as a disincentive to the redevelopment of
brownfields, see John Copeland Nagle, CERCLA, Causation, and Responsibility, 78 MINN. L. REV.
1493, 1533-34 & n.180 (1994).
55. See 141 CONo. REC. H6111 (daily ed. June 20, 1995) (statement of Rep. Zeliff) ("With
Corrections Day, we can make these changes without having to go through an entire reauthori-
zation of legislation which will take months."); GINGRICH, supra note 2, at 226 ("I know that the
traditional answer is that we would have to rewrite the entire Clean Water Act in order to
change things. But what if we focused on just one bad decision?").
56. See generally Neal E. Devins, Regulation of Government Agencies Through Limitation Riders,
1987 DUKE L.J. 456, 460-80 (describing the increasing congressional reliance on the appropria-
tions process to respond to controversial agency and court decisions).
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ment makes it more difficult for members of Congress and the President to
oppose the entire bill because of a particularly objectionable provision.
Most recently, President Clinton first vetoed but then reluctantly signed a
1995 funding bill that included a provision eliminating environmental
obstacles to the salvage of timber in the Pacific Northwest,57 and Congress
tried to include twenty-five riders changing existing law in EPA's 1996
appropriations bills.5" The loss of other congressional oversight devices,
such as legislative vetoes, further encourages the turn to appropriations
riders.59
House and Senate rules prohibit appropriations riders, but those rules
are often avoided or ignored.' Critics complain that appropriations riders
contravene established statutory objectives, bypass committee review, and
often receive hurried deliberation. 61 Defenders of congressional oversight
via the appropriations process note the flexibility, directness, and timeliness
57. A provision in the fiscal 1995 rescissions bill required the Forest Service and the Bureau
of Land Management to promote the harvesting of salvage timber (i.e., dead or damaged trees),
see H.R. 1158, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995), but President Clinton vetoed the bill in part
because of that provision, see Message to the House of Representatives Returning Without
Approval Legislation for Emergency Supplemental Appropriations and Rescissions for Fiscal Year
1995, 31 WEEKLY COMP. PRS. Doc. 994 Uune 7, 1995). When Congress reenacted the bill
after making other changes but still including the timber salvage provision, see H.R. 1944, 104th
Cong., Ist Sess. § 2001 (1995), the President signed the bill notwithstanding his objection to that
provision, see Statement on Budget Rescission Legislation, 31 WEEKLY CoMP. PRES. Doc. 1282
(July 21, 1995) [hereinafter Timber Signing Statement] (signing bill even though "I still do not
believe that this bill should contain any of the provisions relating to timber"); see also Statement
on Agreement with Congress on Budget Rescissions Legislation, 31 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOc.
1162 (June 29, 1995) (indicating intention to sign bill despite timber provisions). The President
then instructed federal agencies to conduct timber salvage in compliance with all environmental
laws except those expressly prohibited. See Timber Signing Statement, supra, at 1282; see also
Dan Glickman, Salvage Sales Will Follow Law, THE OREGONIAN (Portland), Aug. 3, 1995, at DI I
(Secretary of Agriculture explaining the President's directive to federal agencies). Environmental
groups are challenging the salvage provision as contrary to the North American Free Trade
Agreement. See Trade Pact Invoked to Block Logging Law, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 1995, at A13.
But see 141 CONG. REC. H5557-63 (daily ed. May 24, 1995) (statement of Rep. Taylor) (defend-
ing the salvage program).
58. See Full-Scale Environmental Attacks Being Finalized in Budget Bills, OUTSIDE ONLINE
NEWS VIEWS, Oct. 20, 1995, available in http://web2.starwave.com/outside/online/news/
congress/riders.html (identifying riders in appropriations bills for EPA and other agencies that
implement environmental law); House Votes to Drop Controversial Policy "Riders" from EPA Budget
Bill, INSIDE E.P.A., Nov. 3, 1995, at 1-2.
59. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983), held that legislative vetoes violate the bi-
cameralism and presentment clauses of Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution. The demise of
the legislative veto serves as an argument for overturning agency regulations on Corrections Day.
See 141 CONG. REc. H6113 (daily ed. June 20, 1995) (statement of Rep. Tauzin).
60. The House and Senate rules, and their exceptions, are described in Devins, supra note
56, at 458 n.12, 469.
61. Id. at 457-58.
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of reliance on riders." Even though the critics probably outnumber the
proponents of appropriations riders in the abstract, the ability to use the
appropriations process to amend the law continues to prove irresistible
when other avenues for legislative change have closed.
4. Subsequent Legislative History
Members of Congress frequently rely on statements inserted into com-
mittee reports or the Congressional Record to signal their disapproval of a
judicial or agency interpretation of a statute.63  This saves Congress the
time needed to enact a statutory provision embodying its preferred inter-
pretation of an existing statute. These statements, however, are of doubtful
efficacy. Some judges view any legislative history skeptically. Even those
judges who attribute significance to legislative history have been extremely
unimpressed with the relevance of statements made by some members of
Congress after the statutory provision they purport to interpret. Agencies
are more inclined to take such signals seriously because of their continuing
relationship with the congressional committees and members who make
such statements, but the judicial dismissal of subsequent legislative history
limits its usefulness for correcting statutory mistakes.
64
5. Informal Congressional Pressure on Agencies
The most informal devices by which Congress works to change an
agency's interpretation of a statute produce neither a statutory provision
nor a committee report. Members of Congress make their views known to
62. See 2 SENATE COMM. ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, 95TH CONG., 1ST SESS., STUDY
ON FEDERAL REGULATION: CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT OF REGULATORY AGENCIES 31 (1977)
(concluding that "appropriations oversight is effective precisely because the statutory controls are
so direct, unambiguous, and virtually self-enforcing"); Ed Bethune et al., Riding on Appropriations,
LEGAL TIMES, Feb. 12, 1996, at S36 (former congressman and Treasury official among those
arguing that "the appropriations 'rider' can provide one of the most effective, flexible, and prag-
matic tools" for Congress to "influence the implementation of public policy"); James A. Thurber,
The "Corrections Day" Proposal: Wrong Way to Fix Dumb Laws, ROLL CALL, May 8, 1995, at 5
(describing the annual appropriations process as "an excellent vehicle for rectifying problems and
making corrections after appropriate committee hearings and consideration on the floor of the
House").
63. See Brudney, supra note 25, at 5-6 & nn.10- 11 (citing examples); Eskridge & Frickey,
supra note 22, at 39-40 (suggesting that congressional signals form part of an implicit bargain
with the President and the courts).
64. See, e.g., ESKRIDGE, supra note 39, at 226-29 (outlining Justice Scalia's objections to
judicial reliance on legislative history). See generally John Copeland Nagle, Severability, 72 N.C.
L. REV. 203, 249 n.225 (1993) (listing articles debating the relevance of legislative history).
agency officials at oversight hearings, through letters to an agency, and by
staff contacts with agency employees. The informal approach shares the
same problems as reliance on subsequent legislative history, and it suffers
the additional defect of avoiding public scrutiny. But these methods fre-
quently prove the most successful in convincing a reluctant but intimidated
agency to comply with congressional Wishes (or at least the wishes of some
members of Congress).6 5
B. Judicial and Administrative Correction of Statutory Mistakes
Dissatisfaction with these congressional procedures leads some to sup-
port letting the courts and agencies assume the responsibility for correcting
statutory mistakes. The leading proponent of this view is Judge Calabresi,
who has advanced a theory justifying judicial updating of anachronistic
statutes in certain circumstances.66 Calabresi addressed the problem of
obsolete statutes:
[Tihe feeling that, because a statute is hard to revise once it is
passed, laws are governing us that would not and could not be
enacted today, and that some of these laws not only could not be
reenacted but also do not fit, are in some sense inconsistent with,
our whole legal landscape.
67
The purpose of Calabresi's book is to show that the courts are necessary,
capable, and justified in reading statutes in a manner consistent with the
current legal framework, even if that produces an interpretation incon-
sistent with legislative intent. On the one hand, Calabresi finds other legal
institutions-the legislature, agencies, special legislative review com-
missions, and advisory commissions-inadequate to identify and update
anachronistic laws.6' He acknowledges that legislative updating would be
the ideal solution, but he concludes that the legislature is not up to the
task. 69  Nor does he accept "liv[ing] with aging statutes and rely[ing] on
65. See, e.g., 141 CONG. REC. E590 (daily ed. Mar. 14, 1995) (statement of Rep. Fawell)
(explaining how "[1last year, after some pressure from several members of this body, [the
Department of Labor] agreed to stop enforcing the policy [requiring employers to pay employees
for time spent in company vehicles commuting to work] pending a departmental review").
66. GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982).
67. Id. at 2.
68. Id. at 62-64.
69. See, e.g., id. at 6-7 ("I would argue that much of the current criticism of judicial activ-
ism, and of our judicial system generally, can be traced to the rather desperate responses of our
courts to a multitude of obsolete statutes in the face of the manifest incapacity of legislatures to keep
those statutes up to date." (emphasis added)). Calabresi also writes:
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time to render them totally irrelevant."7°  Instead, he embraces a theory
that empowers a court to defeat legislative inertia by switching the burden
of justifying an obsolete statute to the one seeking to rely on it. Assuming
that "common law courts have the power to treat statutes in precisely the
same way that they treat the common law," Calabresi would allow a court
to ignore a statute's clear command if the statute has become sufficiently
out of place with the rest of the legal landscape.7'
A more subtle, but often just as effective, result will be accomplished
by dynamic statutory interpreters. William Eskridge, for example, asserts
that "statutes are bound to change" as they encounter unanticipated cir-
cumstances.72 He adds that the intentions of the enacting Congress are
not necessarily dispositive and that the policy preferences of the current
Congress can influence a court's interpretation as well.73 Likewise, T.
Alexander Aleinikoff defends a "nautical" approach to statutory inter-
pretation that treats statutes like ships launched on a voyage by the en-
acting Congress but whose course can be set by later courts and other
interpreters. 74 Under either view, a court need not wait for Congress to
correct the mistake.
Judicial practice is more modest. Courts routinely defer to Congress to
"correct its mistake, '75 and dissenting judges chastise their colleagues
The most obvious response to the problems caused by the aging of statutes would seem to
be freeing up of the legislatures so that they would find it as easy to revise laws as they do
to pass them. Nevertheless, and perhaps surprisingly, there has been relatively little
pressure to make the fundamental structural reforms that such a move would require.
Id. at 59.
70. Id. at 80.
71. Id. at 82, 160. Given that my concern here relates only to Calabresi's assumption that
judicial updating of statutes is necessary because Congress fails to update statutes itself, I need not
critique the wisdom of his proposal. His thesis is questioned in ESKRIDGE, supra note 39, at 230;
Lawrence C. Marshall, "Let Congress Do It": The Case for an Absolute Rule of Statutory Stare
Decisis, 88 MICH. L. REV. 177, 230 (1989). Nonetheless, since joining the Second Circuit, Judge
Calabresi has reaffirmed his belief that "[ilt may occasionally be desirable for courts to pressure
legislatures to reconsider outdated statutes so that, unless the legislatures make clear their con-
tinued preference for disparate treatment, like cases may be treated alike." Taber v. Maine, 45
F.3d 598, 607 (2d Cir. 1995).
72. ESKRIDGE, supra note 39, at 10.
73. Id. at 7, 11.
74. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Updating Statutory Interpretation, 87 MICH. L. REV. 20,
56-66 (1988).
75. See, e.g., Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 63 n.2 (1990); see also Neal v. United
States, 116 S. Ct. 763, 769 (1996) ("Congress, not this Court, has the responsibility for revising
its statutes."). Hart and Sacks stated the traditional approach:
The words of the statute are what the legislature has enacted as law, and all that it has is
the power to enact .... Courts on occasion can correct mistakes, as by inserting or strik-
ing out a negative, when it is completely clear from the context that a mistake has been
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when they fail to wait for Congress to act. 6 There are, however, excep-
tions. Almost all courts will correct a "scrivener's error. '77 Additionally,
most courts will interpret statutes contrary to the statutory language if
necessary to avoid an "absurd result," assuming that the legislature could
not have intended such a result and that it is therefore proper for a court to
correct it. Yet the absurd results doctrine is not without problems. Judges
debate the level of absurdity needed to justify a judicial correction. In
Public Citizen v. United States Department of Justice,78 for example, Justice
Brennan's majority opinion rejected the literal reading of the statute
because it produced an "odd" result,79 while Justice Kennedy's con-
currence insisted that courts could not displace the statutory text unless it
yielded a truly "absurd" result.' °
The Supreme Court has also been willing to correct statutory language
contrary to legislative intent. Acknowledging that statutory language is the
best evidence of legislative intent,8' the Court has nonetheless found
other evidence of legislative intent so compelling and the statutory lan-
guage so troubling that a judicial correction was appropriate. Thus, the
Court has denied that it has "a duty to enforce the statute as written even
made. But they cannot permit the legislative process, and all the other processes which
depend upon the integrity of language, to be subverted by the misuse of words.
HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE
MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAw 1375 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds.,
1994).
76. See, e.g., Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 115 S. Ct. 1061, 1079-80, 1083 (1995) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) (stating that she "would leave any alteration to Congress" because of the history of
the statute and concluding that "[i]f adjustment is in order, as the Court's opinion powerfully
suggests it is, Congress is equipped to undertake the alteration" (footnote omitted)); Coliseum
Cartage Co. v. Rubbermaid Statesville, Inc., 975 F.2d 1022, 1028 (4th Cir. 1992) (Wilkinson, J.,
dissenting) (advising that the majority's "alteration of the statutory scheme must be left to
Congress" and that the majority "confers upon itself the clear prerogatives of Congress"). Lest
you think you can predict the Supreme Court in statutory interpretation cases, Gustafson was
decided 5-4, with Justices Scalia, Thomas and Breyer joining Justice Ginsburg in dissent.
77. See, e.g., Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, Dep't of Labor v.
Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 115 S. Ct. 1278, 1291 (1995) (Ginsburg, J., con-
curring in the judgment); United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 464, 474 (1994)
(Scalia, J., dissenting); United States Nat'l Bank v. Independent Ins. Agents of Am., 113 S. Ct.
2173 (1993).
78. 491 U.S. 440 (1989).
79. Id. at 453-54 & n.9.
80. Id. at 473 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment). Green v. Bock Laundry Machine
Co., 490 U.S. 504 (1989), presented a similar problem, as discussed in ESKRIDGE, supra note 39,
at 44-47, 51. The absurd result rule is explored in depth in Veronica M. Dougherty, Absurdity
and the Limits of Literalism: Defining the Absurd Result Principle in Statutory Interpretation, 44 AM. U.
L. REV. 127 (1994).
81. See, e.g., INS v. Cardozo-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 432 n.12 (1987) (referring to "the
strong presumption that Congress expresses its intent through the language it chooses").
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if fully convinced that every Member of the enacting Congress, as well as
the President who signed the Act, intended a different result. 8 2 A strik-
ing illustration of this principle occurred in Heppner v. Alyeska Pipeline
Service Company, 3 where the Ninth Circuit limited the strict liability
imposed by the Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act for "damages in
connection with or resulting from activities along or in the vicinity of the
proposed trans-Alaskan pipeline right-of-way" to environmental damages.84
Judge Wallace defended this narrow reading as supported by the general
emphasis in the legislative history on environmental injuries. He further
claimed that the courts can correct "a drafting error ... when Congress
uses more sweeping language than it would if it were attending carefully to
fact situations, outside the scope of its purpose, to which the language
might be erroneously understood to apply," provided that the court can
ascertain the actual legislative intent.8 5 The opposing view, articulated by
Justice Scalia, asserts that evidence of legislative intent drawn from the
legislative history can never displace clear statutory language, and "if that is
not what Congress meant then Congress has made a mistake and Congress
will have to correct it. "86
Agencies engage in the same practices-and then some. Indeed,
Chevron, U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council v may be understood
to afford administrative agencies more leeway than courts in interpreting
statutes to overcome mistakes.88 Chevron does not say that an agency
82. Conroy v. Aniskoff, 113 S. Ct. 1562, 1567 n.12 (1993). As the fictional Justice Foster
opined, "The correction of obvious legislative errors or oversights is not to supplant the legisla-
tive will, but to make that will effective." Lon Fuller, The Case of the Speluncean Explorers, 62
HARV. L. REV. 616, 626 (1949).
83. 665 F.2d 868 (9th Cir. 1981).
84. 43 U.S.C. § 1653(a)(1) (1994).
85. Heppner, 665 F.2d at 872. Conversely, Judge Wallace denied that the courts can correct
an unexpected absurd result caused by a legislative failure "to trace through the effects of the
legislation in cases in which the statute was intended by Congress to apply." Id. The distinction
between the two kinds of mistakes seems difficult to maintain.
86. Conroy, 113 S. Ct. at 1572 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment); accord In re
M.M.D., 662 A.2d 837, 857 (D.C. 1995) ("It is entirely possible that every legislator who voted
on the adoption statute would answer, if asked, that Congress only intended for married couples
to adopt children. But the fact is, Congress did not say so.").
87. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
88. If Chevron means that an agency's interpretation of a statute will be given deference by
the courts so long as it is not inconsistent with the plain language of the statute, then an agency
will often enjoy considerable maneuvering room to produce an interpretation that best accom-
plishes the agency's goals. That may or may not be the same thing as accomplishing the enact-
ing Congress's goals, so it opens a window for using statutory interpretation to fix mistakes made
by the enacting Congress. On the other hand, if Chevron simply means that an agency's inter-
pretation will receive judicial deference only if the statute's plain language and other evidence of
legislative intent fail to disclose how Congress wanted to answer the interpretive question, then
must interpret a statute in the manner most faithful to the enacting
Congress; an agency need only show that its preferred interpretation is not
contrary to the original legislative intent.8 9
III. THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CoRRECTIoNs DAY
Corrections Day and the proposals which preceded it suggest that there
may be another way. The purpose of Corrections Day is to provide
Congress with a regular procedure by which to correct statutory mistakes.
Such a procedure would avoid many of the pitfalls in the existing solutions
described above. Rather than waiting up to five years for the next re-
authorization of a statute, it would happen regularly and frequently. It
would not hold appropriations bills hostage to substantive statutory con-
cerns. And it would give Congress the power to amend legislation, unlike
the expanded interpretive role permitted for agencies by Chevron and for
courts by theories of dynamic statutory interpretation.
But will it work? A system for correcting statutory mistakes must
accomplish at least two functions: it must identify the mistakes that need
fixing, and it must provide an expedited procedure for correcting them.
Cardozo, Friendly, and Ginsburg focused on the first function; the
Corrections Day procedure established by the House performs the second.
The House procedure for Corrections Day is less clear about how statutory
mistakes and the legislation to correct them will be identified; the House
may need a more reliable process for distinguishing corrections from other
legislation. But the teachings of Cardozo, Friendly, and Ginsburg may offer
an answer to this problem, if it is indeed a problem.
agencies have less ability to correct statutory mistakes as they implement the statute.
89. To be sure, forced adherence to the statutory text can prevent an agency from achieving
its goals, including correcting statutory mistakes. See Herz, supra note 47, at 204 (arguing that
"with judicial textualism ascendant, a court will not correct the error, nor will it allow an agency
to do so"). But agencies still retain the power to interpret ambiguous statutory commands.
Indeed, deference to agency interpretations may give the President's views more weight than they
received during the enactment of the legislation. See McNollgast, Positive Canons: The Role of
Legislative Bargains in Statutory Interpretation, 80 CEO. L.J. 705, 737 (1992).
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A. The Prior Proposals
I begin with Justice Cardozo, though as he noted, one could find the
same thought in the previous writings of Pound, Bentham, and others.' °
Cardozo was concerned about "anachronism and injustice" in the law.9'
Despite his faith in the common law to adapt to changing circumstances,
he concluded that at times legislative action .was needed to produce speedy,
needed reform.2 But he despaired of any mechanism for the courts, or
others, to alert the legislature to the need for reform in particular circum-
stances. Thus he proposed a "Ministry of Justice" comprised of law profes-
sors, judges, and members of the bar to identify perceived shortcomings in
the law and to propose remedial legislation.
93
Judge Friendly expanded on Cardozo's proposal forty years later.94
Friendly objected to statutes that displaced the courts yet contained mis-
takes that the legislature failed to correct. These mistakes included statu-
tory language that conflicted with likely legislative intent and ambiguous
90. Cardozo, supra note 16, at 114. Cardozo credited Roscoe Pound, supra note 17, at 146,
Roscoe Pound, Juristic Problems of National Progress, 22 AM. J. Soc. 721, 729, 731 (1917), and
other earlier writers. Doug Bellis, Assistant Counsel in the House Office of Legislative Counsel,
traces the concept back even further into the nineteenth century in the writings of Alexis de
Tocqueville and the statutory revision movement. Letter from M. Douglass Bellis to John Nagle,
(Feb. 6, 1996) (on file with author).
91. Cardozo, supra note 16, at 113; see also id. at 116 ("The ugly or antiquated or unjust rule
is there. It will not budge unless uprooted.").
92. Id. at 115 ("Tlhere are times when deliverance, if we are to have it-at least, if we are
to have it with reasonable speed-must come to us, not from within, but from without."); id. at
118 (noting that there are illustrations "where speedy change is hopeless unless effected from
without").
93. Id. at 123-25. Cardozo was less insistent about the composition of the body than the
need for it. Id. at 124. Nonetheless, he advised that state attorneys general were too overworked
to perform the task, and he found the work of bar associations sometimes constructive but also
"desultory and sporadic." Id. at 123-24.
94. Friendly, supra note 15, at 787. By the time Friendly wrote,
[viast areas once the province of the judges have been enclosed by the legislature .... I
thus do not at all lament the diminished role of the judge vis-A-vis the legislator as a
maker of law. What I do lament is that the legislator has diminished the role of the
judge by occupying vast fields and then has failed to keep them ploughed.
Id. at 790, 792.
1292 43 UCLA LAw REVIEW 1267 (1996)
and vague statutes where there was no real controversy within the legis-
lature about the appropriate clarification. 95  Friendly listed seven reasons
why the legislature was better positioned to correct statutory mistakes than
the courts,96 and he sharply criticized Congress for not making the
correction of such mistakes a higher priority. 7  But Friendly found
Cardozo's notion of a "Ministry of Justice" to smack of an executive depart-
ment, whereas to Friendly "[ilt would seem elementary that an agency
whose task is to formulate legislation and secure its enactment should be
attached to the legislature. '" 98 Friendly envisioned a committee examining
all Supreme Court and federal court of appeals decisions, addressing only
noncontroversial matters (at least until it had established itself), and sup-
porting rather than supplanting existing congressional committees by doing
the work that had been left undone. 99
Justice Ginsburg picked up where Friendly left off."°  She, too,
focused on statutory mistakes involving noncontroversial issues that
Congress tried but failed to resolve when it enacted unintentionally ambig-
95. Id. at 792-93; see also id. at 796 (describing "the manifold dannations in the veritable
jungle of review of action by federal agencies" and concluding that "[n]o vital interests are at
stake here; these weeds have grown simply for lack of a gardener"); id. at 801 ("The examples I
have chosen ... are not in those highly controversial areas in which lack of action may reflect
not lack of interest or activity but equivalence of conflicting pressures-in which the chessmen
have been moved and moved but the game has been a draw.").
96. Friendly noted:
[Tihe legislature's superior resources for fact gathering; its ability to act without awaiting
an adventitious concatenation of the determined party, the right set of facts, the persua-
sive lawyer, and the perceptive court; its power to frame pragmatic rules departing from
strict logic, and to fashion a broad new regime or to bring new facts within an existing
one; its practice of changing law solely for the future in contrast to the general judicial
reluctance so to proceed; and, finally, the greater assurance that a legislative solution is
not likely to run counter to the popular will: all these give the legislature a position of
decided advantage, if only it will use it.
Id. at 791-92 (citations omitted).
97. Id. at 792 ("My criticism is not of Congress's fallibility, but of its failure to move
promptly to correction."); id. at 793 ("[R]ectification of error does not appear to enjoy a high
priority on congressional calendars."); id. at 795 (waiting for the Supreme Court to answer a
statutory question is unsatisfactory because "I do not take even three years of confusion lightly").
98. Id. at 804. Instead, Friendly recommended a "committee" comprised of the chairman
and ranking minority members of the House and Senate Judiciary Committees, two other mem-
bers of Congress appointed by the chairmen, a retired federal judge, and several other members
chosen from among legal scholars, retired judges, and senior lawyers. Id. at 805. The committee
would have a small permanent staff but would be aided by law schools, the American Law
Institute, and the American Bar Foundation. Id. Its task would be to attend to the "amendment
or re-examination or legislative development of the laws." Id.
99. Id. at 805-07.
100. Ginsburg, supra note 14, at 995. Ginsburg was a D.C. Circuit judge at the time.
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uous statutory language.'' Ginsburg also agreed that Congress should do
the correcting, and she recommended that Congress should "assign[] to
designated members responsibility to hear judicial pleas for a clear state-
ment of 'what [Congress] meant (or in any event what it means now)."'10 2
She suggested two bodies that could solicit examples of statutory mistakes
and advise concerning possible corrections from all interested parties.' 03
In short, writing over a span of nearly eighty years, three eminent
jurists agreed that statutory mistakes present a problem that should be
solved by Congress.' °4 The details of their preferred solutions varied, but
each of their proposals posited the existence of some system for bringing
statutory mistakes to the attention of Congress and empowering some body
with the responsibility for proposing corrections. Some of those ideas,
especially Justice Cardozo's proposals, took root in state law commissions
charged with identifying statutory mistakes and recommending changes for
the legislature.'0 5  A procedure by which federal courts can notify
Congress about statutory mistakes is being developed by Professor Robert
Katzmann.' °6  If successful, that program could make the vision of
101. See id. at 997, 1013.
102. Id. at 1014 (quoting Arthur D. Hellman, Case Selection in the Burger Court: A Preliminary
Inquiry, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 947, 995 (1985)).
103. Ginsburg suggested that the House's Office of the Law Revision Counsel could empha-
size statutory clarification. Alternately, Congress could create a new committee to review cases
interpreting statutes and to draft proposed statutory amendments if necessary. Id. at 1016 (citing
Letter from Justice Stevens to Rep. Kastenmeier (Oct. 25, 1983), reprinted in A Bill to Establish an
Intercircuit Panel, and for Other Purposes: Hearings on S. 704 Before the Subcomm. on Courts of the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 34-36 (1985)). Ginsburg offered several
options regarding the placement and composition of the committee, including separate com-
mittees in the House and the Senate, a joint subcommittee of the Judiciary Committees of both
chambers, or a committee like that advocated by Judge Friendly that contained members from
outside Congress as well. Id. at 1016-17.
104. Actually, the discussion here understates the judicial support for some kind of cor-
rections mechanism. First Circuit Judge Frank Coffin has called on courts to report statutory
mistakes to Congress. See Frank M. Coffin, Grace Under Pressure: A Call for Judicial Self-Help, 50
OHIO ST. L.J. 399, 403 (1989). Also, Wisconsin Supreme Court Justice Shirley Abrahamson has
encouraged courts to use "their decisions to point out statutory deficiencies so that statutes may
be more intelligible and cohesive, as well as more responsive to the conditions the legislature
sought to address." Shirley S. Abrahamson & Robert L. Hughes, Shall We Dance? Steps for
Legislators and Judges in Statutory Interpretation, 75 MINN. L. REV. 1045, 1092-93 (1991). Apart
from judges, Professor Michael Herz has endorsed Justice Ginsburg's idea. See Herz, supra note
47, at 205.
105. See Abrahamson & Hughes, supra note 104, at 1070-73 (describing the work of state
law revision commissions).
106. See Robert A. Katzmann, Bridging the Statutory Gulf Between Courts and Congress: A
Challenge for Positive Political Theory, 80 GEO. L.J. 653, 665-67 (1992) (describing pilot program in
which the chief staff counsel of the D.C. Circuit will forward statutory opinions to House officials
including the Speaker, the minority leader, the parliamentarian, the general counsel to the clerk,
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Cardozo, Friendly, and Ginsburg a reality. But notifying Congress achieves
little if there is no mechanism for Congress to act on the information it
receives. That is the function of Corrections Day.
B. The Implementation of Corrections Day
House Republicans were caught off guard by Gingrich's idea of a
Corrections Day. Gingrich himself had not considered exactly how
Corrections Day would operate, and the House was preoccupied with consi-
dering the Contract with America. 10 7  So after he established a
Corrections Day Steering Group," s Gingrich testified at a joint hearing
held in May 1995 by subcommittees of the Rules Committee and the
Committee on Government Reform and Oversight to consider a number of
questions raised by Corrections Day and a variety of alternative proce-
dures."° Based on that hearing and further discussions, the advocates of
Corrections Day proposed to amend the House rules to replace the virtually
defunct Consent Calendar with a Corrections Calendar. The House
approved that plan, as modified by the Rules Committee," by a 271-146
vote, having first defeated a Democratic motion to "go back to the drawing
board" 236-185."'
and the legislative counsel).
107. See 141 CONG. REC. Hl188 (daily ed. Feb. 3, 1995) (statements of Reps. Gephardt &
Armey); GINGRICH, supra note 2, at 226, 228.
108. The Corrections Day Steering Group consisted of Republican House members Barbara
Vucanovich, David McIntosh, and Bill Zeliff, with assistance from House Majority Whip Tom
DeLay. The Steering Group is different from the Corrections Day Advisory Committee, dis-
cussed infra at text accompanying notes 113-114, 211.
109. See Corrections Day Repeal of Regulations Hearing, supra note 12, at 4-10 (testimony of
Speaker Gingrich); GINGRICH, supra note 2, at 228.
110. The Rules Committee held another hearing on June 13 on the proposed new
Corrections Day calendar. See Corrections Day Calendar Hearing, supra note 12. A few days later,
the Committee voted 9-4 to approve a resolution establishing the proposed Corrections
Calendar, after amending the resolution to require the Speaker to consult with the minority
leader before placing a bill on the Corrections Calendar. H. REP. No. 144, 104th Cong., 1st
Sess. 7-8 (1995). The Rules Committee rejected Democratic motions to (1) rely on the existing
suspension calendar for corrections, (2) require a 2/3 majority to approve corrections bills, (3)
require the concurrence of the minority leader to the placement of a bill on the Corrections
Calendar, and (4) authorize the Rules Committee to place bills on the Corrections Calendar. Id.
at 6-7.
111. 141 CoNG. REC. H6106, H6115-16 (daily ed. June 20, 1995).
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Under the House approach, Corrections Day will be held on a regular
basis, probably once or twice a month."' A bill must receive committee
review and approval before it may be placed on the Corrections Calendar.
The decision to place a bill on the Corrections Calendar rests with the
Speaker, in consultation with the minority leader, and advised by the
Corrections Day Advisory Committee comprised of seven Republican
House members and five Democratic members."' There is no formal def-
inition of "corrections" bills or "statutory mistakes," though the Advisory
Group has developed an informal definition of its own."4 Measures consi-
dered by the full House under the Corrections Calendar are subject to one
motion to recommit and limited debate, and they can only be amended on
the motion of the chair of the committee with jurisdiction over the bill. A
sixty percent vote is required for approval. A bill that fails to receive the
necessary sixty percent when considered under the Corrections Calendar
may be considered at a later time under a regular calendar.
112. The new procedures amend the House Rules to provide:
4. (a) After a bill has been favorably reported and placed on either the Union or
House Calendar, the Speaker may, after consultation with the'Minority Leader, file with
the Clerk a notice requesting that such bill also be placed upon a special calendar to be
known as the "Corrections Calendar." On the second and fourth Tuesdays of each
month, after the Pledge of Allegiance, the Speaker may direct the Clerk to call the bills
in numerical order which have been on the Corrections Calendar for three legislative
days.
(b) A bill so called shall be considered in the House, debatable for one hour equally
divided and controlled by the chairman and ranking minority member of the primary
committee of jurisdiction reporting the bill, shall not be subject to amendment except
those amendments recommended by the primary committee of jurisdiction or those
offered by the chairman of the primary committee, and the previous question shall be
considered as ordered on the bill and any amendment there to final passage without
intervening motion except one motion to recommit with or without instructions.
(c) A three-fifths vote of the members voting shall be required to pass any bill called
from the Corrections Calendar but the rejection of any such bill, or the sustaining of any
point of order against it or its consideration, shall not cause it to be removed from the
Calendar to which it was originally referred.
H. RES. 168, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995), quoted in 141 CONG. REC. H6104 (daily ed. June 20,
1995).
113. The members of the advisory panel include Republican Representatives Dreier, Ehrlich,
Johnson, McIntosh, Solomon, Vucanovich and Zeliff, and Democratic Representatives Becerra,
Condit, Peterson, Rivers, and Waxman. 141 CONG. REC. H13,676 (daily ed. Nov. 28, 1995)
(statement of Rep. Vucanovich).
114. See infra text accompanying note 211.
Day 1. The first Corrections Day was the most contentious to date.
The House considered one bill, the San Diego Coastal Corrections Act of
1995,"' designed to remedy the very problem that Newt Gingrich had
mentioned when he met with Mayor Golding and conceived the idea for
Corrections Day. San Diego requested a waiver of the Clean Water Act's
secondary treatment requirements for municipal sewage discharged into the
Pacific Ocean." 6 San Diego's supporters cited scientists, the California
EPA, and municipal officials who determined that secondary treatment was
unnecessary in light of the city's existing system, and they justified the
permanent exemption as necessary to avoid spending millions of dollars to
prepare periodic waiver applications and to protect against the EPA chang-
ing its mind in the future." 7  The San Diego House delegation unani-
mously supported the bill."' The opponents of the bill argued that the
problem had already been solved by an imminent EPA waiver, and they
115. H.R. 1943, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
116. Since 1972, the Clean Water Act has required all cities to install technology sufficient
to achieve secondary treatment of municipal sewage, i.e., the removal of solids and biochemical
oxygen demand. See 33 U.S.C. § 131 1(b)(1)(B) (1994); see also 141 CONG. REc. H7563 (daily ed.
July 25, 1995) (statement of Rep. Shuster) (describing the secondary treatment requirement).
Congress amended the Act in 1977 to give cities a once-in-a-lifetime chance to apply to EPA
before 1982 for a waiver of the secondary requirement. See 33 U.S.C. § 1311(h) (1976 & Supp.
I 1978); see also 141 CONG. REc. H7565 (daily ed. July 25, 1995) (statement of Rep. Mineta)
(describing the waiver provision). San Diego failed in its effort for a waiver, so the EPA sued the
city in 1988. The court determined that the city's sewage disposal was "causing significant harm
to the marine environment" and found the city liable for penalties for its failure to comply with
the Act. United States v. City of San Diego, No. 88-1101-B(IEG), 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5459,
at *6 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 18, 1991). After San Diego extended and deepened its outfall pipe, the
court concluded that forcing San Diego to install secondary treatment would not benefit the
environment. The court, however, could not ignore the statutory requirement. See 141 CONG.
REC. H7563 (daily ed. July 25, 1995) (statement of Rep. Shuster) (describing the district court's
decision). In 1994, Congress amended the Act to give San Diego an additional six months to
apply for a waiver, and EPA reached a preliminary decision to approve the waiver on June 12,
1995. See Environmental Protection Agency, U.S. EPA Advances Wastewater Treatment
Waiver for San Diego (June 12, 1995) (news release, on file with author). But San Diego con-
tinued to pursue a permanent legislative solution. In May 1995, the House included a permanent
waiver from the secondary treatment requirements for certain coastal cities (including San Diego)
in its comprehensive bill to reauthorize the Clean Water Act. H.R. 961,104th Cong., 1st Sess,
tit. IX (1995). The prognosis for that bill remained in serious doubt as Congress debated a host of
other issues raised by the Clean Water Act, so San Diego pursued identical but separate legisla-
tion to be considered on Corrections Day.
117. See 141 CNo. REC. H7563-71 (daily ed. July 25, 1995) (statements of Reps. Shuster,
Solomon, Hunter, Filner, Cunningham, McIntosh, and Johnson).
118. Democratic Representative Filner supported the bill, but he questioned the procedures
for Corrections Day. See William M. Welch, House 'Corrections' Have Bumpy Debut, USA
TODAY, July 25, 1995, at 8A (quoting Rep. Filner as opposing Corrections Day because "[ilt
presents the danger of doing things by anecdote or emotion and not going through a legislative
process").
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opposed a permanent waiver as insensitive to future changed conditions
and unfair to other cities who had followed the Clean Water Act's existing
requirements (either by installing secondary treatment or by obtaining a
waiver).119 Both sides accused the other of playing politics with the
issue.120  The House approved the bill 269-156-a sixty-three-percent
majority sufficient under the Corrections Calendar, though short of the
two-thirds requirement House Democrats had sought to require for that
Calendar. But the Senate has not acted on the bill and both the
Administration and California's own Senator Boxer have stated their oppo-
sition to it.'2'
Day 2. The second Corrections Day was less acrimonious. The Oil
Pollution Act (OPA), enacted by Congress in 1990 in the aftermath of the
Exxon Valdez oil spill, imposes significant regulatory and financial responsi-
bility requirements on vessels carrying "oil."'2 Congress probably did
not intend the OPA to apply to vegetable oil, but some federal officials
believed that it should, 2 3 and the unqualified statutory language sup-
ported their position. Thus the Edible Oil Regulatory Reform Act was
designed to require federal regulators to distinguish between vegetable oils
119. See 141 CONG. REC. H7564-74 (daily ed. July 25, 1995) (statements of Reps. Borski,
Clement, Mineta, and Pallone).
120. Compare id. at H7565 (statement of Rep. Mineta) (arguing that the bill "is motivated
solely by politics") with Science vs. Politics: Sewage Exemption Faces Senate Hurdles, SAN DIEGO
UNION-TRIB., July 30, 1995, at G2 (editorializing in favor of the bill because "science should take
precedence over politics when crafting environmental legislation"). The debate got worse. New
Jersey Representative Pallone defended the secondary treatment requirement for all cities, see 141
CONG. REC. H7568 (daily ed. July 25, 1995), causing California (and San Diego) Representative
Bilbray to assert that California's state water standards were twice as stringent as New Jersey's, id.
at H757 1. Two Democratic opponents of the bill then later voiced their hope that San Diego's
beaches would be polluted while the 1996 Republican Convention was held there. See id. at 141
E1518 (daily ed. July 26, 1995) (statement of Rep. Oberstar); Stephen Green, House Panel
Approves Permanent S.D. Waiver from Effluent Standards, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., July 13, 1995,
at B6 (quoting Rep. Menendez).
121. See 141 CONG. REC. H7573 (daily ed. July 25, 1995) (letter quoting an EPA official
opposing the San Diego corrections bill because it is "unnecessary, eliminates public review, and
is scientifically unsound"); James Bornemeier, House OKs Sewage Disposal Exemption for San Diego,
L.A. TIMES, July 26, 1995, at A3, A8 (quoting Senator Boxer as saying that "[y]ou can't 'correct'
San Diego's fouled beaches and spoiled marine environment by throwing the Clean Water Act
out the window, and if the Clean Water Act is the Republicans' idea of a dumb law, then they
are profoundly out of step with the American people").
122. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 2716(a) (1994).
123. See Senate Approves Legislation on Certain Oils, Fats, 52 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 2953
(1994) (noting that in 1993 the Department of Transportation attempted to classify vegetable oil
as a hazardous material); see also 141 CONG. REC. H9751 (daily ed. Oct. 10, 1995) (statement of
Rep. Oberstar) (detailing the environmental impact of edible oils); Jonathan P. Deason, When
Vegetable Oils Spill, WASH. POsT, July 17, 1993, at A16 (letter from EPA official describing ad-
verse environmental effects of spills of vegetable oil).
and petroleum.' Under that corrections bill, vegetable oils and animal
fats would remain subject to regulation, but the extent and scope of such
regulation under the OPA-and any other federal law-would be less than
that imposed on petroleum, greases and other oils. Representative Oberstar
alone objected to the bill, the Corrections Day process, and the inability of
the sponsors to identify which other laws were affected." 5 The House
passed the bill, as did the Senate, and when President Clinton signed the
bill, it became the first product of Corrections Day to become law. 6
Day 3. The House passed three bills on the next Corrections Day.
The Senior Citizens Housing Safety and Economic Relief Act of 1995
addressed two different problems.2 7 The first problem concerned elderly
residents of public housing who were being terrorized by drug and alcohol
users who qualified for such housing because they were disabled. The Act
sought to enable public housing authorities to evict residents who were
threatening the elderly, a power some House members thought the authori-
ties already possessed but which all agreed needed legislative clarifica-
tion. l28 The second part of the Act allowed senior citizens "to enter into
so-called reverse mortgages through which they can remain in their homes
while receiving either a lump sum payment or monthly payments based on
the value of their homes."129 The bill itself received no criticism, though
some Democratic members took the opportunity to attack Republican
housing policies more generally. 3'
124. H.R. 436, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § l(a) (1995) (directing federal agencies to differentiate
between edible oils (such as vegetable oils and animal fats) and other oils and greases (including
petroleum) "in issuing or enforcing any regulation or establishing any interpretation or guideline
related to a fat, oil, or grease under any Federal law"). The background of the problem is
described in 141 CONG. REC. H9752-54 (daily ed. Oct. 10, 1995) (statement of Rep. Ewing).
125. 141 CONG. REC. H9751-52, H9757-58 (daily ed. Oct. 10, 1995) (statement of Rep.
Oberstar).
126. Edible Oil Regulatory Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-55, 109 Stat. 546 (1995).
127. H.R. 117, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
128. Compare 141 CONG. REc. H10,652 (daily ed. Oct. 24, 1995) (statement of Rep.
Gonzalez) (remarking that although the bill is not necessary, it "clarifies current law" and satisfies
housing authorities who believed that they needed "clearer legal guidance") and id. at H10,659
(statement of Rep. Mfume) ("While H.R. 117 does not break any new ground in terms of what a
public housing authority can do to ensure the security and happiness of its senior residents, it
does clarify the intent of Congress in this area.") with id. (statement of Rep. Hoke) ("We are
saying very clearly and for the first tirre that there are certain" conditions for being "able to take
advantage of publicly assisted housing." (emphasis added)).
129. Id. at H10,650 (statement of Rep. Leach). As Representative Moran noted, "[W~e have
so many seniors who are asset rich and cash poor, and so this home-equity conversion mortgage
extension works out very well for them and is going to relieve a lot of anxiety for them." Id. at
H10,652 (statement of Rep. Moran).
130. E.g., id. at H10,657-59 (statement of Rep. Kennedy); id. at H10,658 (statement of Rep.
Gonzalez).
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Another bill was designed to overturn a 1954 Department of Labor
regulation prohibiting anyone under eighteen years of age from throwing
cardboard into a baler in a grocery store.131 Viewing the regulation as
"frozen in time, untouched by technology for more than 40 years,"'32 the
bill proposed to allow sixteen and seventeen-year-old workers to throw
cardboard into turned-off, allegedly safer modem balers that satisfied the
standards of the American National Standards Institute (ANSI). 33 But
the bill faced opposition from child labor advocates and some House mem-
bers who detailed serious injuries suffered by minors working with
balers. 134 The bill passed the House nonetheless.
A third bill derived from a controversial effort by Department of
Justice (DOJ) employees opposed to a proposed crime bill to lobby senior
DOJ officials on behalf of the National Association of Assistant United
States Attorneys. 35 The Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) advised the
Attorney General that federal conflict of interest laws made it a criminal
offense for a federal employee to represent an employee organization in any
matter in which the federal government has a direct and substantial inter-
131. 29 C.F.R. pt. 570, subpt. E. The history of the rule is described in H.R. REP. No. 278,
104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
132. Corrections Day Bills Hearing, supra note 34 (statement of Rep. Combest); see also 141
CONG. REC. H1O,666 (daily ed. Oct. 24, 1995) (statement of Rep. Martini) (arguing that "we can
no longer afford to be shackled to the past by antiquated laws that preclude technological innova-
tions"); id. at H10,662 (statement of Rep. Goodling) (arguing that "paper balers and compactors
were significantly more hazardous machines [in 1954] than the state of the art machines being
built today"). Other supporters argued that "[a] teenager hanging out on the streets of
Washington, D.C. this summer is in a heck of a lot more danger than he would be working at a
local Safeway," Corrections Day Bills Hearing, supra note 34 (statement of Rep. Ewing), and that
the existing regulation was "anachronistic and long overdue for change," id. (statement of
Virginia L. Lutz, Safety Supervisor, Lowes Food Stores, Inc.).
133. H.R. 1114, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1(/) (1995). The bill provides that:
employees who are 16 and 17 years of age shall be permitted to load materials, but not
operate or unload materials, into scrap paper balers and paper box compactors (1) that are
safe for 16- and 17-year-old employees loading the scrap paper balers or paper box com-
pactors, and (2) that cannot operate while being loaded.
Id. The bill deemed balers "safe" only if they complied with ANSI standards, included an on-off
switch, were kept in an off condition, and posted all of the above information. Id. § 2(b).
134. See Corrections Day Bills Hearing, supra note 34 (statement of Linda Golodner, President,
National Consumers League and Co-Chair, Child Labor Coalition); 141 CONG. REC. H10,666
(daily ed. Oct. 24, 1995) (statement of Rep. Lantos) (offering "a few examples of the horrific
injuries which can occur when minors were allowed or were directed to work illegally in the
vicinity of paper balers and compactors"). Representative Owens objected to the bill on constitu-
tional grounds because of its reliance on standards set by ANSI, a private organization. Id. at
H10,662-63 (statement of Rep. Owens).
135. See H.R. REP. No. 230, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995); see also Naftali Bendavid, DOJ
Opinion Limits Lobbying by Prosecutors; Memorandum Could Affect Myriad Federal Employees, LEGAL
TIMES, Dec. 19, 1994, at 1.
est' 36 The "chilling effect" of the OLC opinion prompted the House to
pass the Federal Employee Representation Improvement Act of 1995,
which would amend the conflict of interest laws to allow federal employees
to lobby on behalf of federal employee organizations. 1
37
Day 4. The Federal Reports Elimination and Sunset Act of 1995 was
the first Senate bill to be considered in the House on Corrections Day.1
38
It resulted from a survey of eighty-nine executive departments and agencies
to identify congressional report obligations that "have outlived their useful-
ness."' 39  For example, a requirement that each federal agency report to
Congress annually on its efforts to implement the metric system and a
requirement that the Secretary of the Treasury report monthly on sales of
the World Cup U.S.A. 1994 commemorative coin were among the over
two-hundred obsolete reports." The House passed the bill without objec-
tion after amending the bill to drop one of the reports 4' and the
President signed the bill into law.'42
Another corrections bill repealed a provision of the Social Security
Act that established a cardiac pacemaker registry. 43 That provision had
become redundant when Congress added comprehensive reporting require-
ments to the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetics Act in 1990. No one
objected to eliminating the earlier report, though some House Democrats
136. Memorandum of Assistant Attorney General Walter Dellinger to Attorney General
Janet Reno (Nov. 7, 1994) (interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 205 (1994)); see also 141 CONG. REC.
H10,668 (daily ed. Oct. 24, 1995) (statement of Rep. Hoke) (describing the OLC opinion). I
worked in OLC-indeed, I worked on many conflict of interest questions-from 1988 through
1991, but I do not recall having ever addressed this issue.
137. H.R. 782, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(a) (1995) (amending 18 U.S.C. § 205(d) (1994) to
permit federal employees to represent "any cooperative, voluntary, professional, recreational, or
similar organization or group not established or operated for profit" in most matters before the
federal government). For references to the "chilling effect" of the OLC opinion, see 141 CONG.
REC. H10,668 (daily ed. Oct. 24, 1995) (statement of Rep. Hoke); id. at H10,669 (statement of
Rep. Davis).
138. S. 790, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
139. 141 CONG. REc. H12,228 (daily ed. Nov. 14, 1995) (statement of Rep. Green).
140. Id.
141. After Representative Watt of North Carolina asked why a statistical report on the
Voting Rights Act was on the list, he was assured that the report was duplicative, but the House
unanimously agreed to drop the report just to be safe. Id. at H12,231-32 (daily ed. Nov. 14,
1995). Representative Stark had worried that the abolition of a required Medicare report was
part of a broader attack on Medicare, but he voted for the bill anyway. Id. at H12,228-30 (state-
ments of Rep. Stark).
142. Federal Reports Elimination and Sunset Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-66, 109 Stat. 707
(1995).
143. H.R. 2366, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
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seized the opportunity to call for "corrections" to Republican Medicare and
Medicaid proposals.' 44
Day 5. Two weeks later, the House approved two bills in response to
Richie v. American Council for Gift Annuities,14' a pending class action
alleging antitrust and securities violations by a nonprofit organization that
determines annuity rates for over 1,500 charitable organizations.'46 The
Philanthropy Protection Act of 1995 was designed to solve the securities
law question by "mak[ing] it clear that charitable income funds are not
investment vehicles.' 47  The Charitable Gift Annuity Antitrust Act of
1995 eliminated antitrust liability for charitable organizations who "use, or
agree to use, the same annuity rate for the purpose of issuing 1 or more
charitable gift annuities."'14 Both bills passed the House without objec-
tion, and the Senate and the President approved both bills as well.
149
Day 6. The two bills passed on December 12, 1995 amended legis-
lation drafted by Representative Waxman, now a member of the
Corrections Day Advisory Committee. A 1977 statute required stores to
post warnings about products containing saccharin; warnings about sac-
charin are now required on the packages themselves. Nonetheless, the law
continued to be enforced by private parties who sued fifty-four retail stores
in 1994 under California's bounty hunter statute.15 Thus the House
passed a corrections bill to eliminate the posted warning requirement.
The second bill transformed the Clean Air Act's employer trip reduc-
tion program from a mandatory requirement into a discretionary option.
As amended in 1990, the Clean Air Act required states with serious air
pollution problems to encourage large private employers to promote car-
pooling as part of the state's implementation plan.' That provision had
been the subject of open rebellion by affected states,' yet fears of reopen-
144. See 141 CONG. REc. H12,207-08 (daily ed. Nov. 14, 1995) (statement of Rep. Stark);
id. at H12,208-11 (statements of Rep. Brown).
145. Civ. No. 7-94CV-128-X (N.D. Tex.).
146. See 141 CONG. REc. H13,677-78 (daily ed. Nov. 28, 1995) (statement of Rep. Hyde).
147. Id. at H13,673 (statement of Rep. Bliley); see H.R. 2519, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
148. H.R. 2525, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(a) (1995).
149. Charitable Gift Annuity Antitrust Relief Act, Pub. L. No. 104-63, 109 Stat. 687 (1995);
Philanthropy Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 104-62, 109 Stat. 682 (1995).
150. 141 CONG. REc. H14,266 (daily ed. Dec. 12, 1995) (statement of Rep. Bilbray).
151. 42 U.S.C. § 7511a(d)(1)(B) (1994).
152. See H.R. REP. No. 387, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995), available in LEXIS, Legis Library,
CMTRPT File (noting that California, Illinois, Maryland, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Texas
all attempted to avoid the requirements of the carpooling program in 1995).
Corrections Day 1301
43 UCLA LAW REVIEW 1267 (1996)
ing the delicate legislative compromise undergirding the 1990 Clean Air
Act Amendments prevented any legislative changes. But the support of
Representative Waxman, a key drafter and vocal supporter of the 1990
amendments, encouraged the House to pass a corrections bill to allow a
state to drop the carpooling plan if the same emissions reductions were
achieved in some other manner.'53 The Senate passed the bill, too, and
the President signed it into law" 54
Day 7. Like the first Corrections Day, the most recent Corrections
Day amended the Clean Water Act-and like the first Corrections Day, it
sparked some opposition in the House. The Constructed Water
Conveyances Reform Act of 1995 proposed to reduce the water quality
goals and regulatory requirements governing "a manmade water transport
system constructed for the purpose of transporting water for agricultural
purposes or municipal and industrial water supply in a waterway that is not
and never was a natural waterway." '155 The bill responded to the objec-
tions of western states and farmers to EPA's stringent application of the
Clean Water Act to canals, irrigation ditches, and other "constructed water
conveyances."' 56  EPA and some environmentalists objected to the bill,
however, because it would give states excessive latitude to dispense with
environmental restrictions on agricultural conveyances.' The House
passed the bill but it has yet to be considered by the Senate.
On the first seven Corrections Days, therefore, the House passed eight
of twelve bills without any stated opposition (and a ninth bill with only one
dissenting member). Four of those bills amended environmental statutes,
two amended housing laws, two eliminated government reporting require-
ments, and one bill each amended federal statutes governing antitrust,
153. 141 CONG. REC. H14,269 (daily ed. Dec. 12, 1995) (statement of Rep. Waxman) ("The
bill is emissions neutral. It requires States that opt out of the [carpooling] program to make up
the emission reductions from other sources.... I think it is a helpful piece of legislation in clari-
fying and correcting a problem that has come into ... controversy in some of the States."); see
also Waxman Changes from Foe to Fan of Corrections Day, NAT'L JOURNAL'S CONG. DAILY, Dec.
11, 1995 (quoting Rep. Manzullo as saying that "[pleople see that Henry [Waxman] is for the bill,
so it must be OK").
154. Clean Air Act: Optional Mandated Trip Reduction, Pub. L. No. 104-70, 109 Stat. 773
(1995).
155. H.R. 2567, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. § 2 (1996) (creating 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(2)(C)(iv)).
H.R. 2567 was originally part of the House's Clean Water Act reauthorization bill. See 142
CONG. REC. H750 (daily ed. Jan. 23, 1996) (statement of Rep. Shuster).
156. 142 CONG. REc. H750-51 (daily ed. Jan. 23, 1996) (statement of Rep. Shuster).
157. See id. at H755 (daily ed. Jan. 23, 1996) (statement of Rep. Pallone); id. at H753-54
(statement of Rep. Miller); Memorandum from Catherine Roberts, Congressional Liason Officer,
EPA, to Felicia Marcus, Regional Administrator, EPA Gan. 18, 1996), reprinted in 142 CONG.
REC. H753-54 (daily ed. Jan. 23, 1996) (statement of Rep. Miller).
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securities, workplace safety, and federal conflict of interest law. Five of the
first twelve corrections bills have already become law.
C. The Case for Corrections Day
Corrections Day promises to perform a variety of functions. It is
designed to satisfy the longstanding desire-voiced by Justices Cardozo and
Ginsburg, and Judge Friendly-to quickly remedy statutory mistakes. 5
Corrections Day can reduce the pressure on administrative agencies and
state officials to remedy statutory mistakes themselves or suffer the political
consequences.'59 It can correct those statutory mistakes the courts iden-
tify but refuse to fix themselves. It can also increase agency accountability
to Congress and the public.)" By doing so, Corrections Day can serve as
"a much-needed antidote to public cynicism over the federal govern-
ment."161
At least that is the hope. The principal dissenters from Corrections
Day can be divided into two groups. The first group consists of academics
and others who fear that an expedited legislative process will yield bad
policy that contains mistakes of its own. The second group-House Demo-
crats, environmentalists, and others-dislike any legislation favored by
Newt Gingrich and House Republicans on political grounds, and thus
oppose any device that makes it easier for this Congress to enact legislation.
158. See, e.g., Corrections Day Repeal of Regulations Hearing, supra note 12, at 19. (testimony of
Rep. Vucanovich) ("Corrections Day offers this body a chance to show that we can react to real
needs in a timely manner .... I am more convinced than ever of the need for a rapid response
system for misguided government."); Krent & Rossi, supra note 11, at 22 ("Congress has never
devoted sufficient attention to fixing prior mistakes, and an allotted period to cure drafting errors
or unintentional ambiguities can only be applauded.").
159. See, e.g., Corrections Day Repeal of Regulations Hearing, supra note 12, at 59 (statement of
Peter D. Robinson) ("When a business or a community has a dispute with a federal agency, speci-
fic corrective legislation may be the only remedy, but it has also often been the last recourse.").
160. See, e.g., 141 CONG. REC. H13,675 (daily ed. Nov. 28, 1995) (statement of Rep.
Waxman) ("I am particularly pleased to report that the existence of this Corrections Calendar has
persuaded agencies to correct problems on their own .... "); id. at H7567 (daily ed. July 25,
1995) (statement of Rep. Packard) ("Corrections Day signals the people's triumph over silly,
obsolete rules and regulations and the bureaucracies that thrive on them."); id. at H6114 (daily
ed. June 20, 1995) (statement of Rep. Solomon) ("When we bring this first corrections bill to the
floor, every bureaucrat in this Government is going to pay attention... [and] think twice before
they promulgate the kinds of rules and regulations that go far beyond what the legislative intent
of Congress is."); GINGRICH, supra note 2, at 227-28 ("[Corrections Day] allows the elected
officials to reassert the right of citizens to supervise their bureaucracy. In the welfare state, power
keeps slipping away to the bureaucrats and citizens feel defenseless Corrections Day will shift
the momentum.").
161. Corrections Day Repeal of Regulations Hearing, supra note 12, at 11 (testimony of Rep.
Solomon).
The groups overlap in some instances, with the legislative process and
political objectors complaining that the bad policy results of Corrections
Day will be consistently tilted in favor of the House majority. I disagree.
The legislative process critics raise several points. First, they fear that
Corrections Day will shortcut congressional deliberation of legislation and
discard institutional safeguards. 6 ' This concern is not frivolous, but it is
one the House kept in mind when it designed Corrections Day. The
Corrections Calendar expedites floor consideration of bills, but it leaves the
requirement of committee review and approval and other so-called
"vetogates" untouched.'63 Many of the concerns about eliminating the
deliberative process were voiced before the House established the proce-
dures for Corrections Day, and the critics incorrectly assumed that commit-
tee review would be foregone. Indeed, the House continued to rely on the
existing committee system precisely to guarantee full committee consi-
deration of any measure before it reaches the House floor under the
Corrections Calendar.6M The inability of any House member (except the
chair of the committee reporting the bill) to amend a corrections bill fur-
ther protects the role of the committee process. The sixty percent super-
majority requirement may produce greater floor deliberation in order to
achieve the necessary consensus. 65 And the unwillingness to bundle un-
related issues in a single corrections bill provides an extra protection lack-
162. See Corrections Day Calendar Hearing, supra note 12 (testimony of Dr. Roger H. David-
son) (arguing that "[u]ndoing [administrative] rules and regulations ought to require an equivalent
amount of thought and deliberation" as enacting them in the first place under the APA); 142
CONG. REC. H755-56 (daily ed. Jan. 23, 1996) (statement of Rep. Oberstar) (criticizing the Cor-
rections Day process as "a very dangerous deviation from long-established process that protects
interests that otherwise do not have an adequate voice"); Krent & Rossi, supra note 11, at 23
(worrying that "[w]ith only one day to consider and vote on so many 'corrections,' deliberation
and debate are likely to suffer"); Thurber, supra note 62, at 5; Barbara F. Vucanovich, Testimony
of Congresswoman Barbara F. Vucanovich Before the House Committee on Rules (June 13, 1995)
(news release, on file with author) [hereinafter Vucanovich News Release] ("The challenge...
[is] to ensure that the House not compound one mistake with yet another.")
163. "Vetogates" are the constitutional and institutional hurdles that a bill must overcome
before it becomes law. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 44-45 (2d ed.
1995).
164. See 141 CONG. REC. H6110-11 (daily ed. June 20, 1995) (statement of Rep. Clinger); id.
at H6111 (statement of Rep. Zeliff); id. at H6114 (statement of Rep. Waldholtz); see also
Corrections Day Repeal of Regulations Hearing, supra note 12, at 73 (testimony of Rep. Dreier); id.
at 11 (testimony of Rep. Solomon).
165. I thank Harold Krent for this observation.
43 UCLA LAW REVIEW 1267 (1996)1304
Corrections Day 1305
ing in most other congressional procedures."' That the resulting proce-
dure for floor consideration is not all that different from the suspension
calendar and other devices mutes the complaints that this particular process
will be particularly dangerous to the legislative process. 167
Any concern that Corrections Day would reduce congressional deli-
beration on affected issues should have disappeared amidst complaints that
the House devoted too much attention to San Diego's predicament. 168
And two other checks remain: the Senate and the President. The Senate
has not shown any desire to establish a Corrections Day of its own because,
as Senator Dole joked, "[wie don't do many things wrong over here. "169
The Administration has indicated that the President is already correcting
more mistakes than Corrections Day will accommodate anyway.7 0 But
even if the Senate and the President joined the House in promoting the
expedited correction of statutory mistakes, the process objection fails
because shortcutting the existing system is the whole point of Corrections
Day. The widespread agreement that Congress needs to respond to statu-
tory mistakes more quickly suggests a willingness to stop deliberation at
some point in order to act.'
7'
166. Only two of the bills considered on Corrections Day could possibly be characterized as
bundling unrelated issues: H.R. 117, which simultaneously barred drug users from public housing
for the elderly and authorized the elderly to enter into reverse mortgages, and S. 790, which
abolished over 200 congressional reporting requirements. See supra text accompanying notes
127-130.
167. Under the House's suspension calendar, floor consideration of legislation is limited to
forty minutes of debate, amendments are prohibited, and a two-thirds majority is required for
approval. See Corrections Day Repeal of Regulations Hearing, supra note 12, at 68 (testimony of
William R. Pitts, Jr.). The House is considering a change to the Corrections Day procedure that
would allow the chair and ranking member of the committee with jurisdiction over a bill to agree
to dispense with the committee report requirement, a change that would mirror the existing
procedures for considering a bill under the suspension calendar.
168. See 141 CONG. REC. H7574 (daily ed. July 25, 1995) (statement of Rep. Mineta) ("We
are here today with the full House considering the details of one permit for one community out
of the thousands of permits issued by States and EPA.").
169. Jennifer Babson, A Quicker Way and Special Day for Erasing Debatable Rules, 53 CONG.
Q. WKLY. REP. 1807 (1995) (quoting Sen. Dole).
170. See The White House Washington, DC Regular Briefing Briefer: Michael McCurry, FED.
NEWS SERV. WASH. PACKAGE, 1995 WL 8792907 (Aug. 2, 1995).
171. See, e.g., Corrections Day Repeal of Regulations Hearing, supra note 12, at 12 (testimony of
Rep. Solomon) (commenting that "we can have a truncated process without sacrificing informed
and deliberative decisionmaking"); Vucanovich News Release, supra note 162 (asserting that the
proposed approach "strikes a balance between the need for quick action on ridiculous laws and
appropriate caution to ensure the cure is not worse than the disease").
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Second, the process critics fear that special interest groups will be able
to use Corrections Day to undo legislative compromises and gain benefits
they were unable to secure in court, before an agency, or in Congress when
the legislation was originally enacted.' Another good point-but
another one to which the House responded. In addition to the obstacles
presented by the requirement of committee approval, the proponents of
Corrections Day have repeatedly stated their desire to avoid controversial
issues, 173 and any attempt to reopen a critical part of a legislative compro-
mise can expect to be controversial. Corrections Day allowed the House to
amend one specific provision of the Clean Air Act without undoing all of
the compromises reached in 1990.174 Nor have the wealthy and the power-
ful been the sole beneficiaries of the legislation approved by the House on
Corrections Day. Elderly residents of public housing, farmers, cities and
states, charitable organizations, federal employees, and grocery stores have
been among the groups successfully promoting corrections bills. One bill
was promoted by a group with "little access" to the legislative process-
lesbians and gay men-to reverse a decision made by the Justice Depart-
ment, which has "easily the best record" before Congress. 175  Thus
172. See, e.g., 141 CONG. REc. H9751 (daily ed. Oct. 10, 1995) (statement of Rep. Oberstar)
(arguing that "this process of corrections day is just fraught with danger and fraught with
opportunity for special interests"); id. at H7570 (daily ed. July 25, 1995) (statement of Rep.
Waxman) ("We do not want the corrections calendar to become a fast track for special interests
seeking favored treatment."); id. at H6109 (daily ed. June 20, 1995) (statement of Rep. Collins)
("Corrections Day could very easily become Special Interest Protection Day."); Krent & Rossi,
supra note 11, at 23 ("Corrections Day may thus become a bonanza for special interests."); Tom
Teepen, Old Pork Doled Out a New Way, ATLANTA J. & CONsT., Feb. 12, 1995, at B7 (arguing
that Corrections Day "would riddle national policies with exemptions for the connected").
173. See infra note 199 and accompanying text. But see 141 CONG. REC. H7568 (daily ed.
July 25, 1995) (statement of Rep. Vucanovich) (asserting that corrections bills need not receive
unanimous support).
174. See supra text accompanying notes 151-154; see also 141 CONG. REC. H14,269 (daily
ed. Dec. 12, 1995) (statement of Rep. Bilirakis) (noting that H.R. 325 "demonstrates that it is
possible to alter provisions of the Clean Air Act without sacrificing environmental goals").
175. The Gay, Lesbian or Bisexual Employees of the Federal Government wrote a letter
supporting H.R. 782, the bill to overturn the Justice Department's restrictive interpretation of
the federal conflict of interest laws. Letter from Leonard P. Hirsch to Hon. Barney Frank (Oct.
20, 1995), reprinted in 141 CONG. REC. H10,668 (daily ed. Oct. 24, 1995); see also text accom-
panying notes 135-137 (describing H.R. 782). Among the other groups that have benefited from
Corrections Day, state and local governments have the "greatest access" to Congress, while
organized big business, educational institutions, religious groups, and small business all have
"moderate access," according to Professor Eskridge's pre-Corrections Day study of which groups
have had the most success in persuading Congress to enact desired legislation. ESKRIDGE, supra
note 39, at 153. To be sure, Congress was controlled by a Democratic majority during most of
the period that Eskridge examined, but the divided government of much of that period persists
with a Democratic President today.
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Representative Waxman-the first to raise the concern about special
interests-now agrees that "this has not happened." '176
Moreover, the fear about the role of special interests on Corrections
Day fails to adequately distinguish the role of such groups in Congress and
in regulatory agencies on any other day. The existing procedures for cor-
recting statutory mistakes, especially appropriations riders and reliance on
legislative history, are susceptible to manipulation by special interests.'77
Corrections Day may make it easier for traditionally disadvantaged groups
to convince Congress to correct statutory mistakes affecting them. Propo-
nents of Corrections Day thus argue that it will actually discourage favori-
tism toward special interests. 178
A third legislative process objection argues that Corrections Day will
produce "legislation by anecdotes"-bills addressed to solve problems that
do not really exist."79  Here again, the House required committee
approval so that Congress "avoid[s] unreported corrections bills that would
force us to base our votes only on anecdotal evidence or heat-of-the-
moment impulses or passions."' 8°  The committee approval requirement
has already served that function. A bill to overturn an OSHA regulation
requiring four firefighters to respond to every fire appeared much more
controversial after committee hearings were completed. 8' And even if it
were to occur, legislating by anecdote would hardly be limited to
Corrections Day. For example, Congress enacted CERCLA primarily in
response to the hazardous waste crisis at Love Canal."2
176. 141 CONG. REC. H13,675 (daily ed. Nov. 28, 1995) (statement of Rep. Waxman).
Representative Waxman continued with a broad defense of Corrections Day. Id.
177. See Brudney, supra note 25, at 50 (observing that "regulated entities likely to be affected
at the post enactment stage often lobby for the inclusion of specific report language focused on
statutory decisions by federal courts").
178. See 141 CONG. REC. H6112 (daily ed. June 20, 1995) (statement of Rep. McIntosh)
(arguing that Corrections Day "is one of the critically important reforms that we are making in
this House of Representatives not to cater to special interests, but to actually cater to what the
American people want us to do").
179. See supra note 121 and accompanying text. Representative Waxman opposed the San
Diego corrections bill because "[i]t is based on false anecdote," 141 CONG. REC. H7570 (daily ed.
July 25, 1995) (statement of Rep. Waxman), but he has since become a supporter of Corrections
Day. See supra text accompanying note 176.
180. Corrections Day Repeal of Regulations Hearing, supra note 12, at 12 (testimony of Rep.
Solomon).
181. See infra text accompanying note 207.
182. See, e.g., United States v. Rohm & Haas Co., 2 F.3d 1265, 1270 (3d Cir. 1993)
("CERCLA was passed in December 1980 during the closing days of the Carter administration in
response to the Love Canal controversy."); see also WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW (2d ed. 1994):
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Harold Krent and Jim Rossi raise several different, but related, con-
cerns. They suggest that Corrections Day will result in less congressional
accountability, not more. They observe that Congress often avoids difficult
issues by enacting broad statutory language and leaving the details for the
implementing agency, and they conclude that Corrections Day will enable
Congress to take credit for reversing unpopular agency interpretations of
ambiguous statutes. 8 3 Accordingly, say Krent and Rossi, the proper solu-
tion is to promote greater accountability for agency decisions.I84
This solution does not follow from the problem they described. Krent
and Rossi object to a perception-the view that Congress will receive credit
for Corrections Day while avoiding blame for statutory mistakes in the first
place. But if the statutory mistakes that Corrections Day is designed to fix
are all viewed as legislative mistakes, as argued above, then Congress will
receive both the blame for the original mistake and the credit for correcting
it. Many in Congress will surely try to accept the credit and not the blame,
but others (agencies, interested groups, and members of the opposition party
in Congress) will have an incentive to set the story straight. The San
Diego example upon which Krent and Rossi rely confirms that Congress
will not be able to take credit for correcting mistakes of its own making,
nor will Congress be able to claim credit for fixing mistakes that had
already been remedied.'85
Careful historians should acknowledge that the Superfund law was well along the evolu-
tionary path towards enactment before Love Canal burst into public prominence. Love
Canal contributed to the enactment of Superfund, to be sure, but more as a reinforcer
and mobilizer of official opinion than as a source of new ideas. Love Canal had every-
thing necessary for made-for-television drama ....
Id. at 682.
183. The same point was made in Stanley C. Brubaker, Slouching Toward Constitutional Duty;
The Legislative Veto and the Delegation of Authority, 1 CONST. COMMENTARY 81, 94-95 (1984); see
also Teepen, supra note 172, at B7 (asserting that Corrections Day "would institutionalize cheap
shots at regulation").
184. Krent & Rossi, supra note 11, at 23.
185. See 141 CONG. REC. H7564 (daily ed. July 25, 1995) (statement of Rep. Mineta) (con-
tending that "no further legislative action is necessary for San Diego to be relieved from the
secondary treatment requirements of the Clean Water Act"); id. at H7571 (statement of Rep.
Borski) (arguing that "[w]hat this bill is seeking to correct has already been corrected"); Kenneth
J. Cooper, House Vote Mucks with EPA; "Corrections Day" Measure Strengthens San Diego Pollution
Waiver, WASH. POST, July 26, 1995, at A21 (noting that "in a way, the House was correcting
itself more than the EPA," and quoting EPA Administrator Carol Browner as saying that
"Corrections Day proceedings cynically pretend to 'correct' something that was solved through
President Clinton's leadership last year"). Other Corrections Days demonstrate that the House
will not be able to claim credit for mistakes that have already been corrected. See, e.g., 141
CONo. REc. H9751 (daily ed. Oct. 10, 1995) (statement of Rep. Oberstar) (observing that the
regulations treating vegetable oil in the same manner as petroleum had already been withdrawn
by the agency).
Krent and Rossi also fear that Corrections Day will become burden-
some for Congress if it gets involved in the kinds of fact-specific decisions
that are best handled by administrative procedures. The experience with
Corrections Day indicates that the House has devoted more attention to
statutory details, but that is precisely the result that Cardozo, Friendly,
Ginsburg, and others have been advocating throughout this century. The
institution of Corrections Day may also increase congressional efficiency by
providing a recognized channel to address concerns that otherwise were
considered on an ad hoc basis through appropriations riders, selective legis-
lative history, and less public processes. Krent and Rossi further admonish
that "Congress should focus on ways to improve agency performance,"
1"'
but there is some evidence that Corrections Day has encouraged agencies
themselves to improve their performance.
8 7
The final legislative process objection claims that the kind of specific
legislation produced by Corrections Day undermines the consistency of
laws.' No one wants private legislation to become the rule, instead of
the exception. But some problems cannot be solved by a general legislative
command. In fact, complaints about "one-size-fits-all" federal regulation
appear throughout the call for Corrections Day. I8 9 The consistency of
the laws is not threatened when different problems are resolved by different
rules.' 9 The alternatives in such cases are to enact specific legislation or
to rely on administrative agencies to fashion specific regulations and to
decide particular cases based on their peculiar facts. That Congress often
chooses the latter alternative does not render the first illegitimate.'9'
186. Krent & Rossi, supra note 11, at 23; see also id. ("If we provide agency bureaucrats with
incentives to correct their own 'mistakes,' we can increase the accountability of-rather than
further politicize-the regulatory process."). Krent and Rossi call on Congress to consider agency
requests to waive regulations, a recommendation that seems at odds with their concern about
congressional micromanagement of specific agency decisions.
187. See supra text accompanying note 160.
188. See Corrections Day Calendar Hearing, supra note 12 (testimony of Dr. Roger H.
Davidson) ("Lawmaking is most effective when it pursues general principles rather than narrow
problems.").
189. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
190. See Abner S. Greene, Kiryas Joel and Two Mistakes About Equality, 96 COLUM. L. REV.
1, 59-65 (1996).
191. As the Washington Post editorialized:
[M]any mistaken regulatory decisions are made because the laws as written by Congress
require a certain consistency. A rule that is reasonable in general might be unreasonable
in a particular case. For regulators, the problem often lies in a desire to avoid being
arbitrary by adhering strictly to laws passed by Congress. In such cases, only Congress
can change the rules.
Corrections Day, WASH. PosT, supra note 8, at A14.
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The second group of Corrections Day opponents consists of House
Democrats, environmentalists, and others who would like the 104th
Congress to enact less legislation, not more. In one sense Corrections Day
threatens groups that fear any legislation produced by the 104th Congress.
Yet again, the proponents of Corrections Day worked to meet this criticism.
They structured Corrections Day to include several features intended to
ensure that corrections legislation receives bipartisan support. In particular,
the sixty percent supermajority requirement for every proposed correction
prevents a closely divided Congress from enacting controversial legislation
under the Corrections Calendar. But the political objectors are not satis-
fied, and they may have a point.
Here the dispute returns to the definition of a statutory mistake. The
political objectors to Corrections Day fear the House will enact legislation
on Corrections Day that amends statutes or regulations that they do not
view as mistaken. The House rule creating the Corrections Calendar lacks
any definition of "correction" or "mistake." But the debate preceding the
adoption of the Corrections Day procedure and the bills considered on the
Corrections Days held so far indicate the kinds of measures considered in
such an expedited fashion. The mistakes corrected should be obvious,'92
dumb, 93 or expensive.'94 They can be the result of a drafting error, an
192. See Thurber, supra note 62, at 5; Vucanovich News Release, supra note 162.
193. See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 144, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1995) ("ludicrous" laws); 141
CONG. REc. H10,658 (daily ed. Oct. 24, 1995) (statement of Rep. Goss) (characterizing the place-
ment of "violent drug abusers and alcoholics intentionally into taxpayers [sic] subsidized senior
housing project[s]" as "dumb"); id. at H6114 (daily ed. June 20, 1995) (statement of Rep.
Solomon) ("silly, dumb, and ludicrous" laws); id. at H61 11 (statement of Rep. ZelifO ("most ridic-
ulous, outrageous, [and] dumb" laws); supra text accompanying notes 5-6.
194. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 144, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1995) (laws that "impose a
severe financial burden on Americans"); 141 CONG. REC. H14,272 (daily ed. Dec. 12, 1995)
(statement of Rep. Archer) (describing the 1990 Clean Air Act's carpooling program as a
"costly... mandate"); id. at H12,228 (daily ed. Nov. 14, 1995) (statement of Rep. Green)
(noting that the Federal Report Elimination and Sunset Act of 1995 "is estimated to save over $2
million in costs in printing costs and paperwork"); id. at H9750 (daily ed. Oct. 10, 1995) (state-
ment of Rep. Burr) (describing the application of the Oil Pollution Act to vegetable oil as a
"burdensome problem created by certain Federal regulations"); id. at H6114 (daily ed. June 20,
1995) (statement of Rep. DeLay) ("unduly costly" laws); id. at H6104 (statement of Rep.
Solomon) ("costly" laws).
1310 43 UCLA LAW REVIEW 1267 (1996)
Corrections Day 1311
unintentional ambiguity, 95 a judicial or agency misinterpretation,196  a
provision that has proved to be a failure, 197 or a provision that became
outdated because of changed circumstances.'9" The legislative solutions
195. See 141 CONG. REC. H12,206 (daily ed. Nov. 14, 1995) (statement of Rep. Brown)
(characterizing duplicative reporting requirements imposed by the Social Security Act and the
Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetics Act as "a legislative oversight"); id. at H10,650 (daily ed. Oct.
24, 1995) (statement of Rep. Lazio) (asserting that the presence of drug addicts and alcoholics in
elderly-only housing projects demonstrates that "[t]oo often, the best laid plans of HUD and
Congress have effects that were never intended"); id. at H9752 (daily ed. Oct. 10, 1995) (state-
ment of Rep. Vucanovich) (asking "Who could have predicted during the rush to respond to the
Valdez accident that we would inadvertently impact consumers and farmers the way we did by
not clearly defining the word oil?"). More generally, one Corrections Day supporter has observed
that "[l]awmaking is simply not the means to which the Federal Government must aspire to
anticipate with precision every possible situation, obligation, and exception." Id. at H10,664
(daily ed. Oct. 24, 1995) (statement of Rep. Ehrlich).
196. See, e.g., 142 id. at H751 (statement of Rep. Boehlert) (arguing that "there are times
when the Clean Water Act is interpreted and applied too narrowly and the views of State and
local water officials are not adequately taken into account"); 141 id. at H10,668 (daily ed. Oct.
24, 1995) (statement of Rep. Hoke) (asserting that OLC misinterpreted 18 U.S.C. § 205 to pro-
hibit federal employees to represent an employee organization in any matter in which the federal
government has a direct and substantial interest). But see id. at H10,670 (statement of Rep.
Morella) (claiming that "[t]he Justice Department was correct in its interpretation of the law, but
in doing so, it compromised the spirit of the law").
197. See id. at H14,270 (daily ed. Dec. 12, 1995) (statement of Rep. Hastert) (observing that
the 1990 Clean Air Act's carpooling program "has failed nationwide").
198. See, e.g., id. at H12,230 (daily ed. Nov. 14, 1995) (statement of Rep. Ehrlich) ("Correc-
tions Day was established to correct outdated ... legislation."). For examples, see id. at H14,266
(daily ed. Dec. 12, 1995) (statement of Rep. Waxman) (supporting a bill repealing "a provision in
law that requires the posting of a warning sign about the potential dangers of saccharin which is
really no longer necessary"); id. at H10,666 (daily ed. Oct. 24, 1995) (statement of Rep.
Stenholm) ("In 1954, heavy-duty industrial machinery, like the paper baler, was substantially
more dangerous than today.... It's time we updated this regulation."); id. at H6104 (daily ed.
June 20, 1995) (statement of Rep. Solomon) ("obsolete" laws); id. at H61 10 (statement of Rep.
Clinger) ("outdated" laws); id. at H6113 (statement of.Rep. Bereuter) ("a law that has outlived
whatever usefulness it may have had"); id. at H6114 (statement of Rep. Hayworth) ("outmoded
laws"); see also supra note 164. The Common Sense Legislation initiative established by the
Illinois House of Representatives emphasizes "archaic" laws. Dan Rutherford, Rutherford Bring-
ing Common Sense to Springfield (Jan. 17, 1996) (news release, on file with author) (citing a
statute regulating the use of mules in coals mines even though mules are no longer used in coal
mines).
to the mistakes should be noncontroversial, 199 narrowly focused,2°  and
able to receive bipartisan support.20'
These adjectives, colorful though they may be, are not self-defining (in
other words, you know a statutory mistake when you see one).02 As a
result, the debate over Corrections Day mirrored the simultaneous debate
over federal regulatory reform. To oversimplify, House Republicans criti-
cized "overregulation" while House Democrats sought to block the
"gutting" of environmental and safety laws. House Democrats defended
measures-such as the prohibition on teenagers using paper balers-that
House Republicans found "dumb," "expensive," and fine candidates for
Corrections Day.2 3 Faced with such differences, Democrats objected to
the absence of a definition of "correction" for purposes of the Corrections
Calendar.2 4  The permanent exemption from the Clean Water Act
granted to San Diego on the first Corrections Day only increased the skep-
ticism. The content of the Corrections Calendar lies within the discretion
of the Speaker, who is advised by a bipartisan screening committee, but the
political objectors distrust the Speaker-especially this Speaker-to place
only noncontroversial bills on the Corrections Calendar. It is no wonder,
then, that Corrections Day itself became controversial.
199. See Corrections Day Repeal of Regulations Hearing, supra note 12, at 11-12 (testimony of
Rep. Solomon); id. at 19 (testimony of Rep. Vucanovich). For an example of legislation that fails
the noncontroversial test, consider Representative Schroeder's suggestion that the repeal of a
provision of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 that criminalizes the distribution of informa-
tion about abortion over the Internet should be considered on Corrections Day. See Congress
Gets Bills to Repeal Telecom Act Abortion Provision, COMM. DAILY, Mar. 7, 1996, at 2.
200. See, e.g., Corrections Day Repeal of Regulations Hearing, supra note 12, at 19 (testimony of
Rep. Vucanovich) (corrections bills should avoid "far-reaching" items); 141 CONG. REc. H6114
(daily ed. June 20, 1995) (statement of Rep. Solomon) (corrections bills "will be confined to a
single subject").
201. Gingrich testified that "this will not work if it is just a partisan game." Corrections Day
Repeal of Regulations Hearing, supra note 12, at 7 (testimony of Speaker Gingrich); accord id. at 73
(testimony of Rep. Dreier); id. at 19 (testimony of Rep. Vucanovich). The House report encour-
aged such bipartisanship, see H.R. REP. NO. 144, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1995), but the
Democratic minority found it lacking. Id. at 12-13 (minority views of Reps. Moakley, Frost,
Beilenson & Hall). All of the bills considered on Corrections Day have received substantial
bipartisan support. See infra text accompanying notes 205-206.
202. Cf. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
203. Compare 141 CONG. REC. H10,665 (daily ed. Oct. 24, 1995) (statement of Rep. Bonilla)
(describing the regulation prohibiting 16- and 17-year-olds from operating paper balers as "one of
the dumbest rules we have on the books today") with id. at H10,662 (statement of Rep. Owens)
(denying that the baler regulation is "either senseless or silly") and id. at H10,665 (statement of
Rep. Mink) (claiming that repeal of the baler regulation "will gut vital protections for youth in
the retail industry").
204. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 144, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1995) (minority views of Reps.
Moakley, Frost, Beilenson & Hall); 141 CONG. REc. H6111 (daily ed. June 20, 1995) (statement
of Rep. Dingell).
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There are two possible solutions. Experience may prove that the
Corrections Day process now in place actually works. Most of the legisla-
tion approved on Corrections Day has been drafted and approved on a
bipartisan basis.205 Only three of the eleven bills approved by the House
on Corrections Day faced more than one stated opponent; all of the bills
received substantial bipartisan support. °6 The willingness to keep once-
promising candidates off the Corrections Calendar once their divisiveness
appears further supports the adequacy of the existing procedures. 207  And
some of the bills approved by the House on Corrections Day would seem to
satisfy anyone's definition of a statutory mistake. But it is unlikely that a
rule has no defenders. Congress probably did not intend the Oil Pollution
Act to apply to vegetable oil, but some federal officials believe that it
205. For references by House Democrats to the bipartisan nature of Corrections Day, see 142
CONG. REc. H752 (daily ed. Jan. 23, 1996) (statement of Rep. Condit) (supporting the
Constructed Water Conveyances Reform Act of 1995); 141 id. at H14,270 (daily ed. Dec. 12,
1995) (statement of Rep. Greenwood) (supporting legislation to amend the Clean Air Act's car-
pooling requirements); id. at H13,678 (daily ed. Nov. 28, 1995) (statement of Rep. Conyers)
(noting the bipartisan support for the Charitable Gift Annuity Antitrust Relief Act of 1995,
though suggesting that the bill should have been considered under the suspension calendar); id. at
H13,674 (statement of Rep. Markey) (supporting the Philanthropy Protection Act of 1995); id. at
H12,211 (daily ed. Nov. 14, 1995) (statement of Rep. Brown) (supporting legislation to eliminate
a report required by the Social Security Act); id. at H12,228 (statement of Rep. Green) (support-
ing the Federal Reports Elimination and Sunset Act of 1995); id. at H10,664 (daily ed. Oct. 24,
1995) (statement of Rep. Peterson) (defending the reversal of the Department of Labor's prohibi-
tion on 16- and 17-year-olds operating paper balers); id. at H10,665 (statement of Rep. Hoyer)
(same); id. at H10,659-60 (statement of Rep. Mfume) (defending the Senior Citizens Housing
Safety and Economic Relief Act of 1995); id. at H10,652 (statement of Rep. Gonzalez) (same).
206. See supra text accompanying notes 115-157.
207. See 141 CONG. REC. H13,675 (daily ed. Nov. 28, 1995) (statement of Rep. Waxman)
(observing that the Corrections Day Advisory Committee has been "rejecting bills that do not
meet the corrections day criteria because they are controversial or address significant policy issues
that should be considered under regular legislative procedures"). For example, a House subcom-
mittee held hearings in July on a bill that would overturn a recent Occupational Safety and
Health Administration (OSHA) decision interpreting a regulation requiring four firefighters to
respond to a fire in a building (two firefighters in the building and two firefighters remaining
outside for rescue or assistance operations). Western towns and firefighters support the bill to
eliminate the four firefighter requirement because of the difficulty of assembling four firefighters
to respond to fires in small, remote Western communities. Corrections Day Bills Hearing, supra
note 34 (testimony of Thomas Kraft, Gasser Assocs., & Raymond Brunstrom, Truckee Meadows
Fire Protection District, in support of H.R. 1783, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995)); accord id. (testi-
mony of Rep. Vucanovich). But other firefighters vigorously defend OSHA's rule, taking parti-
cular exception to considering the bill on Corrections Day. Id. (testimony of Harold A.
Schaitberger, Executive Assistant to the General President, International Association of
Firefighters) ("Perhaps most disturbing is that HR 1783 is being considered for the Corrections
Day Calendar .... Calling a regulation that protects fire fighters' lives 'dumb' is deeply offensive
to the brave men and women of the American fire service."). As a result of those concerns, the
bill has not been considered on Corrections Day.
should, and the unqualified statutory language can support their posi-
tion.208  If controversy is inevitable,2°  then which statutory mistakes
should the House address on Corrections Day?
Cardozo, Ginsburg and Friendly may offer an answer. Each focused on
identifying statutory mistakes and making them known to Congress; none
of them worried about how Congress would decide which mistakes to cor-
rect and which to leave alone-or which were really mistakes and which
were not. If the goal is to bring problems to Congress's attention so that it
can act, then the House's new system to implement Corrections Day will
work well. The announcement of Corrections Day produced an outpouring
of letters, editorials, and other submissions to Congress highlighting alleged
statutory mistakes. Contests for uncovering more mistakes have been sug-
gested, and an Internet home page to receive proposals may be forthcoming
as well. One thing is for sure: There will be no shortage of candidates for
Corrections Day. Bringing such statutory mistakes to the attention of
Congress satisfies the hopes of Cardozo, Friendly, and Ginsburg. And, so
the argument goes, if they were not concerned about the list being over-
inclusive (i.e., including statutory provisions that some do not count as a
mistake), then neither should we.
That response is unlikely to satisfy the political objectors, so I turn to
the second possible solution. The House may find it necessary to adjust the
process in a further effort to separate the corrections from everything else.
The most likely addition would be a more formal procedure for determining
which bills should be placed on the Corrections Calendar in the first
instance. A binding definition of "corrections" or "mistake" may be diffi-
cult because people (and members of Congress) disagree about what fits
those terms or what is "dumb," but at least one state employs such a defini-
tion, 210  and the nonbinding criteria developed by the bipartisan
208. See supra note 122.
209. The designers of Corrections Day admit as much. See 141 CONG. REC. H7568 (daily
ed. July 25, 1995) (statement of Rep. Vucanovich) ("[T]he fact that this bill does not have unani-
mous support does not disqualify it from the corrections procedure.... [I]n designing the cor-
rections procedure we anticipated some opposition .... If we restrict ourselves to only those
items with unanimous support we would not need the Corrections Calendar."); id. at H6104
(daily ed. June 20, 1995) (statement of Rep. Solomon) ("The bills should be relatively noncontro-
versial and bipartisan, but there is bound to be some controversy on some of these measures.
Even so-called stupid rules will have their defenders.").
210. Wisconsin charges its Revisor of Statutes to inform the Law Revision Committee of the
state legislature of any judicial decisions in which Wisconsin statutes "are stated to be in conflict,
ambiguous, anachronistic, unconstitutional or otherwise in need of revision." Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 13.93(2)(d) (West 1986). See generally Abrahamson & Hughes, supra note 104, at 1065-66
(describing the Wisconsin statutory revision system).
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Corrections Day Advisory Committee appear to be working well."'
Absent an agreeable definition, the screening function could be served by a
heightened process. The Advisory Committee meets to consider which
bills are eligible for the Corrections Calendar, essentially creating a second
level of committee approval (albeit one that relied on the report and infor-
mation gathered by the committee with substantive jurisdiction). Or
potential corrections legislation could be flagged as such before committee
consideration occurred so that potential opponents would be on notice that
the expedited floor consideration procedures could come into play. Simply
labeling a proposed bill as a corrections bill may elicit special attention
from interested parties."' Finally, some of the proposals unsuccessfully
offered by the minority members of the House Rules Committee may yet
become useful."' But none of these alternatives need to be explored
unless, and until, the fears of the political objectors are proven true.
IV. STATUTORY INTERPRETATION AFTER CORRECTIONS DAY
Corrections Day demonstrates that Congress can identify and correct
statutory mistakes. Indeed, the concerns about Corrections Day center on
whether it will change too much, not too little. This is contrary to con-
ventional wisdom. Many theories and doctrines of statutory interpretation
assume that Congress is too busy or uninterested in correcting statutory
mistakes. What follows is an initial list, surely not exhaustive, of some of
the approaches to statutory interpretation that may merit reconsideration
after Corrections Day.214
Courts and agencies should correct statutory mistakes. As noted
above,21 5 courts correct some kinds of statutory mistakes. More provoca-
tively, now-Judge Calabresi has encouraged courts to explicitly update
outmoded statutes, while theories of dynamic statutory interpretation sup-
port judicial resolution of some statutory mistakes." 6  All of these
theories have been justified in part on the assumption that Congress
211. See 141 CONG. REC. H13,675 (daily ed. Nov. 28, 1995) (statement of Rep. Waxman)
("The guidelines we developed for the Corrections Day Advisory Committee say that a correc-
tions bill should address laws and regulations that are ambiguous, arbitrary, or ludicrous. The bill
should be noncontroversial and have broad bipartisan support. The idea was to provide a forum
for correcting silly, burdensome regulations .... ).
212. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
213. See supra text accompanying note 110.
214. For a discussion of some of these issues, see Solimine & Walker, supra note 25, at
428-33.
215. See supra text accompanying notes 77-85.
216. See supra text accompanying notes 66-74.
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cannot, or will not, correct statutory mistakes itself. Calabresi responded to
"the rather desperate responses of our courts to a multitude of obsolete
statutes in the face of the manifest incapacity of legislatures to keep those
statutes up to date." 17 Eskridge posits that "[blecause it is hard to enact
statutes, the ones that are enacted have to last a long time." ' Other
writers defend a broader role for agencies in interpreting statutes because
"Congress often is unable to correct its mistakes." '19
Corrections Day shows that it is possible to construct a procedure by
which Congress can correct many more statutory mistakes than it has
before. The mere possibility of such a procedure, whether or not Congress
chooses to employ it, points toward a reduced judicial and administrative
role in correcting statutory mistakes. The need for a court to update or
otherwise modify a statute that Congress found unnecessary to correct
becomes difficult to defend when Congress had an opportunity to do so
itself. Surprisingly, the arguments against Corrections Day further support
this claim. The inability to agree about what constitutes a statutory mis-
take complicates the establishment of a procedure for Congress to correct
such mistakes, but that same inability calls into question any judicial or
administrative assumption of the same task. Congress is free to enact new
legislation even if it unfairly characterizes a previous provision as a statutory
mistake; courts and agencies enjoy no such power. The presumed authority
of courts to correct statutory mistakes rests on their ability to identify such
mistakes, an ability the criticisms of Corrections Day call into question.
Legislative signals besides those contained in the statutory text are more
suspect. Courts may rely on legislative history when interpreting a statute,
some argue, because "Congress cannot resolve all relevant issues in the
statutory text and still have time to transact any other legislative busi-
ness." '  This hyperbole becomes less true in light of Corrections Day.
Congress can more easily enact a statute overturning a mistaken court or
agency decision instead of signalling its disapproval through a statement
added to a committee report. This is not to say that Congress can now
217. CALABRESI, supra note 66, at 6-7.
218. EsKRIDGE, supra note 39, at 10; accord FRANCIS A.R. BENNION, STATUTORY INTER-
PRETATION 356 (1984) ("Constant formal updating is not practicable, so an Act takes on a life of
its own.").
219. John P. Dwyer, The Pathology of Symbolic Legislation, 17 EcOLOGY L.Q. 233, 287 (1990);
accord id. at 283, 287 (referring to the difficulty of amending statutes).
220. Brudney, supra note 25, at 7; see also Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 22, at 40.
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suddenly resolve all issues through statutory language that will be applied in
the future to unexpected situations. Rather, the argument is relative: The
easier it is to enact statutory language to solve a problem, the less justifiable
it is for Congress to express its intent through other legislative signals such
as legislative history.
Congressional acquiescence arguments are marginally better. Courts some-
times accord significance to what Congress has not done. If the courts (or,
on some occasions, agencies) have interpreted a statute a particular way and
Congress has not amended the statute, a court may assume that Congress
agrees with the interpretation because it has acquiesced in it. The argu-
ment gains force if it can be demonstrated that Congress considered the
issue but declined to act.2"' The Rehnquist Court has been less impressed
with such arguments, and for good reasons.222 Nonetheless, as Congress
becomes aware of more alleged statutory mistakes, and as it becomes easier
for Congress to correct such mistakes, the force of congressional acquies-
cence arguments increases.
Stare decisis should be even stronger in statutory cases. The Supreme
Court adheres to a strong presumption of stare decisis once it has inter-
preted a statute. 23 The presumption is stronger in statutory cases than in
constitutional cases precisely because Congress can change mistaken
Supreme Court statutory interpretation decisions, but it cannot change
mistaken Supreme Court constitutional law decisions absent a constitu-
tional amendment.224 Corrections Day supports this distinction, and as it
makes it easier for Congress to overturn mistaken statutory interpretation
decisions, it suggests that the presumption of stare decisis should be even
stronger. In this respect Corrections Day supports Lawrence Marshall's call
for an absolute rule of stare decisis in statutory interpretation cases.2
This list is obviously incomplete and ignores other rationales for the
doctrines involved. Nor do I mean to endorse each conclusion. But this
221. See Marshall, supra note 71, at 184-96.
222. See generally ESKRIDGE, supra note 39, at 241-52.
223. See, e.g., Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172-73 (1989).
224. The classic explanation of this distinction appears in Bumet v. Coronado Oil & Gas
Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406-07 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). For another justification for statutory
stare decisis, see Neal v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 763, 769 (1996) ("Were we to alter our statu-
tory interpretations from case to case, Congress would have less reason to exercise its responsi-
bility to correct statutes that are thought to be unwise or unfair.").
225. Marshall, supra note 71, at 208-38. Marshall endorsed a rule of absolute stare decisis in
order to prompt Congress to act; my focus has been on whether frequent congressional action
would justify a stronger rule of stare decisis.
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brief discussion begins to show the potential consequences of increased
congressional attention to statutory mistakes.
CONCLUSION
Judges have seemed more concerned than Congress about statutory
mistakes, yet Congress enjoys far more power to correct such mistakes than
the courts. Most judges have responded to this situation by devising ways
for Congress to learn about and correct statutory mistakes; some judges
have found it necessary to take matters into their own hands. Judge
Calabresi is the most direct of those judges-and he was not even a judge at
the time he articulated his theory of judicial updating of statutes. Justices
Ginsburg and Cardozo, and Judge Friendly, encouraged Congress to assume
its responsibilities, but in many instances, Congress declined.
Corrections Day may change that. It suggests that Congress can be
trusted to correct statutory mistakes when necessary. Corrections Day thus
has ramifications for formalism generally. The formal constitutional proce-
dures for enacting legislation in particular, and of separation of powers more
generally, have been viewed as outmoded by many theorists. Hence the
widespread condemnation of Chief Justice Burger's opinion INS v.
Chadha.226 Corrections Day suggests that formal constitutional arrange-
ments do work and are adaptable to modern problems in the administrative
state.
Admittedly, Corrections Day will not solve all statutory mistakes.
Indeed, Corrections Day alone will not solve any statutory mistakes-at
least until the Senate adopts a comparable procedure and the President
approves the results of the procedure. The case for theories of statutory
interpretation that permit (or encourage) judicial or administrative cor-
rections fails nonetheless. Congress will not correct those statutory mis-
takes that are unimportant or controversial. Even Corrections Day has
limits: Whatever the time allotted to the procedure, it promises to leave
many possible candidates uncorrected. But Corrections Day demonstrates
that Congress could fix such mistakes if it thought it important enough to
do so. Demands for judicial or administrative corrections must then
explain why such action is justified when Congress found the need to
change the law insufficiently compelling. Conversely, the controversial
statutory mistakes left uncorrected by Congress are even less worthy of
judicial resolution. Here, at last, the expansive definition of statutory
226. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
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mistake reaches its limit. If Congress cannot agree that it made a mis-
take-in other words, if those who oppose an interpretation of a statute
cannot overcome those who endorse that interpretation-then the courts
are ill-equipped to decide that Congress made a mistake after all.
The authors of Corrections Day had a much more modest goal.
Congress has long needed a procedure by which it can quickly correct
statutory mistakes. The speed with which state and local officials, inter-
ested parties, and the general public offered their own examples of statutory
mistakes shows that Corrections Day strikes a chord that Congress would
do well to heed. The new Corrections Day procedures offer the House the
opportunity to revisit and revise statutes at a much smaller institutional
cost than the existing mechanisms for congressional action. The concerns
about such an expedited procedure are legitimate, but they can all be
answered. Besides, Benjamin Cardozo, Henry Friendly, Ruth Bader
Ginsburg and Newt Gingrich can't all be wrong.

